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COMMISSION 
OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
The Vice President 
Sir, 
Brussels, 22 July 1981 
SG(81) D/9677-EN 
The Commission sends you with this letter the draft of the 5th Medium 
Term Economic Policy Programme drawn up in accordance with Article 6 of 
the Convergence Decision of 18 February 1974. 
The Commission has not changed the preliminary draft prepared by the 
Economic Policy Committee, but in adopting it as the draft programme has 
included in it the annexed chapters which the Committee forwarded to it. 
The Commission has however felt it necessary to set out in a "Foreword" 
the comments which it considers appropriate on this draft programme, to bring 
out the role of the Community in the overall strategy proposed. 
This foreword is a development of certain of the ideas set out by 
the Commission. in the report drawn up on 24 June in accordance with the Mandate; 
Part 1 of this report outlines the general framework within which Community 
policies and priorities have their place; the present Communication describes 
the economic strategy which must be implemented both inside the Community and 
by the Community, in order to restore the economic situation, and to offer the 
citizens of Europe better employment prospects and a better future. The 
Commission therefore attaches great importance to it. 
The Commission requests that a wide debate now take place in the 
Community institutions concerned about the aims and the actions proposed, as 
well as on the overall approach which it envisages. 
The Commission thus counts on the support of the Council and the 
Parliament for the guidelines it proposes. As far as the Council is concerned, 
this support could be expressed in a Resolution which, while including the 
overall structure of the proposed strategy, would clearly define the main lines 
of Community action made necessary by the dangers of the present economic 
situation which must not be underestimated. 
The Council should send a report to the European Council's meeting 
in November, in order to inform it of the work in hand and to give it the 
opportunity to confirm these general guidelines and to give political 
impetus to the further work which will be needed. 
enc.: doc. COM(81) 344 final 
His Excellency, 
Lord CARRINGTON, 
President of the Council of the 
European Communities, 
170 rue de La Loi, 
BRUSSELS 1049 
W. HAFERKAMP 
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I. FOREWORD 
1. The first point to be made concerns the scope of the Fifth Medium Term 
Economic Policy Programme. 
1.1 Past experience argues against proposing a quantified programme which 
would be virtually impossible to draw up, given the uncertainties 
of the international economic situation and the diversity of 
situations in the Community. However, even with cautious interpretation, 
the models prepared on our responsibility bring out employment prospects 
sufficiently disturbing to warrant a major effort to reverse the 
trend. The foreseeable increase in the Labour force combined with a 
much more sluggish rate of spontaneous economic growth than in the 
1960s clearly show the danger of a continuing and possibly sharp rise 
in unemployment. 
1.2 To meet this threat, the Commission joins with the Economic Policy 
Committee in recommending action combining the fight against inflation 
with a policy _for the conditions of supply. This policy must be set 
in its true context. 
2. 
The medium term policy programme is above all a policy issue. Its 
purpose is to win approval both for a strategy and for the means needed 
to carry it into effect. This is the more important since the course 
charted will demand discipline, sacrifice and change; and it needs a 
revival of the spirit of tackling the job and the will to succeed which 
was such a feature of post-war Europe. In brief, it demands an active 
consensus, and this will be obtained only if the aim is spelt out 
with clarity and the conditions for success are understood. The aim 
is not to change the inevitable: it is to bring about a Lasting return 
to a satisfactory Level of employment. This must be clearly stated 
by the Council. 
1.3 To achieve this objective, Less dependence on imported energy and very 
high competitivity are essential preconditions. This is doubly 
obvious. If we are not competitive enough we Lose to others our share 
of markets, both at home and abroad, undermining growth and employment 
opportunities. And excessive dependence on imported energy adds to 
balance of payments constraints and magnifies the deflationary bias 
which flows from any major net transfer abroad. 
The employment factor therefore requires that absolute priority be 
given to the expansion of productive investment and the effort to 
establish competitive production costs. These two priorities, subsumed 
in the vital attack on inflation, must influence all the policies 
both macroeconomic and specific pursued by the Member States. But it 
is easier to obtain agreement on the general reasons for this strategy 
than to win acceptance of its necessary implications: a change away 
from consumption in the allocation of resources in the economy, a 
vigorous attack on structural rigidities and the questioning of vested 
interests. The fact that jobs can be saved and new jobs created only 
if these difficult.steps are taken must therefore be driven home by 
forceful and unremitting argument. The debate on the fifth medium term 
policy programme gives the Community and each Member State an excellent 
occasion to do so. 
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2. In the form in which it is drafted for submission to the Council, the 
programme does not seek to settle a matter keenly debated in the preparatory 
stages: the respective role of supply and demand policies in the next few 
years. 1 The Commission does not want to see this problem become a conflict 
of economic doctrines - especially since there is general agreement that ex-
ternal constraints and the nature of the structural changes that must 
be made will inevitably constrict the room for manoeuvre in demand manage-
ment. From one year to the next, the emphasis of policy will depend on 
the overall context and on national situations, even if action must remain 
firmly within the bounds dictated by the requirements set out above. The 
Commission-believes that at prese~t there shoul~ be agreement on the 
following points. 
2.1 Practical measures are urgently needed to get rid of obstacles to 
economic growth. And to the extent that such measures give either general 
or selective encouragement to investment, or favour energy conservation 
and the development of alternative energy sources, they will of them-
selves strengthen overall demand • 
This development policy based on increased competitivity will normally 
require change in budget structures, through the introduction of real 
medium term budget programmes with the following aims: 
-to reduce public deficits, especially those substantially larger than 
the average in the Community, which drain off savings that would other-
wise be invested or which are financed by money creation; 
-to allocate a larger share of public budgetary expenditure to the 
promotion of investment, to training and to cutting production costs -
in other words, to a lasting expansion in employment; 
- in a broader perspective, to make sure that financing the social security 
budget does not reduce the competitivity of certain industries or 
service sectors. 
This policy is particularly necessary for States whose budgetary situation 
has reached the point where there is no further room for manoeuvre. If 
1 See the letter from Mr. Rutten, Chairman of the Economic Policy Committee, 
and the annexed note by the Belgian members of the Committee. 
1 
4. 
only for reasons of confidence in government, it is essential in these 
countries to open up new avenues of action and to stop trying to use 
methods whose value for sound economic management has disappeared. 
2.2 It follows that the opportunities for a selective revival of demand will 
be very different over the period, not only as a result of changing 
economic conditions but also: 
- from one country to another, depending on how successfully the budget 
and key economic aggregates are brought under control; 
- on the degree of success achieved by the measures taken together to 
bring down and stabilize interest rates, in view of the growing burden 
of public debt. 
These two points underscore the importance of, at national level, bringing 
inflation under control and, externally achieving a fundamental improve-
ment in monetary cooperation. 
2.3 In addition, any inevitably limited means that our economies do offer 
for stimulating demand must be deployed in strict compliance with 
certain principles: 
as far as possible, they should be used in areas where manpower 
and production facilities are available and where their direct impact 
on the balance of payments is slight1; 
- where the action is intended to assist the economically weaker sectors 
of society, it should be so devised as to avoid follow-through effects 
on other incomes, especially through the operation of broadly applied 
indexation arrangements, whether these are de jure or de facto. 
.1. 
In connection with supply-side and energy policies, a more systematic appraisal 
should be carried out at Community level of the opportunities for growth, and 
how they should be turned to account, offered by public works and by the 
building and construction industry. As the Commission has recommended, the 
Member States should also as a matter of importance, draw up reserve lists 
of projects so that, when support measures are decided on, these do not for 
want of suitable projects have an inflationary impact or take effect later 
than intended with possible pro-cyclical effects. 
• 
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2.4 Without provoking a doctrinal debate, the Community can help sustain 
as high a level of demand as possible. More active coordination of 
national economic policies is important in this respect: where policies 
are decided each year a systematic effort should be made to ensure that 
they are mutually consistent in order to achieve the m~ltiplier effect, 
however limited, that Community interdependence will generate. 
Other possible courses of action are tb ~e~p in measures to promote 
investment and, where this is justified on economic grounds, practical 
measures of financial solidarity to reduce balance of payments difficulties. 
2.4.1 The real contribution to growth, even if difficult to quantify, that such 
measures and joint opportunities for actibn.can make must .. be systematically 
sought out. This is the substance of everyday life in our Community. 
But there is another component of demand that, if it is to be 
encouraged, requires decisions or initiatives at Community level: 
this is world demand of which the expansion (8% annually during the 
1960s and 6% annually during the 1970s) helped growth within the 
Community and of which the marked slowdown (increase of only 1.5% in 
1981) goes some way towards explaining our own gloomy growth 
prospects. 
2.4.2 More extensive recycling of oil producers' payments surpluses would 
be an important factor in the recovery of world demand. The Community 
authorities are fully aware of this problem, which imposes a 
particular heavy burden on the developing countries,and have 
discussed it at length. The Community, which itself is heavily in 
deficit, has opted as a matter of priority to back the efforts by 
the Bretton Woods in~itutions to at least alleviate if not to 
eliminate these difficulties altogether. 
Results so far have at best been limited and very often disappinting. 
More resolute action on a lasting basis is therefore needed 
immediately. The Council must periodically review the results 
6. 
obtained and update its thinking on the trend of world demand, in 
particular in the developing countries. It must attach special 
importance to the contribution we can make in this respect (by way 
of external action, in cooperation with others, or directly). 
2.5 Community action must therefore help at European Level not only to 
identify the constraints we face together but also to put forward ambitious 
objectives. Year after year, it must impar·t a further stimulus to 
growth and hence to employment through closer policy coordination and 
joint measures and by exploiting the advantages offered by a wide 
market. It must also put to full effect, in the interests of securing 
more stable economic growth, the Community·'s strong position at the 
negociating table, which is far greater than that of the individual 
Member States. 
3. The-Community has a role to play not only in implementing the wide-ranging 
pol icy advocated but also in each of the key policies that go ,to make up 
the strategy defined in the draft programme. The following paragraphs 
discuss this Community dimension, seen not as an end in itself but as an 
additional factor of success for the overall strategy. 
The Commission proposes four main Lines of action: 
- the pursuit of decisive progress in establishing the European Monetary 
System; 
a substantial increase in the level of investment in the Community, more 
specifically investment in energy projects as part of an overall common 
energy strategy; 
- systematic exploitation of the potential of the internal market and of its 
continental dimension; 
-greater Community participation in an active employment policy. 
4. With the European Monetary System, the Community has embarked on an ambitious, 
albeit gradualist venture aimed at stabilization and convergence. The 
contribution made by the system - greater certainty in economic activity, a 
strong incentive to keep the key economic aggregates in balance, a stimulus 
• 
" 
• 
• 
• 
7 • 
to policy convergence and the added weight it gives to Europe in inter-
national monetary cooperation - should be a major factor in the success of 
the strategy set out in the fifth programme. 
4.1 The Commission therefore urges the need to consolidate and develop joint 
action in monetary affairs. 
It believes this is needed for two reasons: 
- a stronger joint approach combined with the closer coordination of 
economic policies called for by the fifth programme, is essential to 
~feguard the degree of monetary integration so far achieved, 
-there is an inescapable link between monetary stability, healthier 
economic prospects and increased employment. 
4.2 As an immediate step, the Council should decide to stren~en internal 
monetary cooperation and to seek ways of organizing relations with 
major non-Community currencies on a more stable basis. For this purpose: 
a) Before the end of the year arrangements should be made, as the very 
purpose of the joint enterprise requires, for national monetary 
policies to be discussed in advance at Community Level and actively 
coordinated on such points as the setting of intermediate objectives, 
interest rate policy and the introduction of important specific 
measures, together with policy on external indebtedness and the 
avoidance of any friction in the use and structure of monetary 
policy instruments. 
Although some progress has been achieved, the diversity of national 
situations and differences of approach have slowed down progress in 
these areas. Recent events show the need to overcome reservations 
and to take more systematic, more resolute and more rapid action. 
b) Use of the ECU, the expression of the monetary will of Europe, should 
be encouraged on financial markets, as the European Council has 
urged. This development, which will inevitably be gradual and no 
doubt slow, will not take place without a tangible demonstration of 
interest on the part of Community and national authorities in the 
shape of the abolition of the technical or statutory rules which 
stand in its way. 
In addition, plans must be made for developing the use of the ECU by 
the EIB and by the Community's borrowing and Lending instruments. 
8. 
c) Cooperation with non-Community currencies must be stepped up. The 
Commission believes that, over and above the definition of European 
positions on sensitive questions like interest rates, and despite 
apparent doctrinal differences, the period we are entering must be 
one of more intense debate, more prec~se proposals and of reinforced 
conviction focussed on: 
- the association of the Community as such with cooperation between 
major currency areas and the extension of such cooperation both 
to national policies where they have major external effects and 
to the management of the international monetary system ( for 
example, questions relating to recycling); 
- the resumption of concerted action with our major partners with 
a view to containing fluctuations on the exchange markets within 
"zones of probability" that take account with sufficient flexibility 
of both trade and monetary factors; 
- management at Community level of the means of intervention agreed 
within this framework, for example by multilateralizing swaps 
and by expressing them at least partly in ECUs. 
Even if they run counter to conventional wisdom, these ideas must 
be examined with an open mind - soon enough to allow the Community 
to clarify its thinking on international monetary cooperation by 
the beginning of 1982. 
d) Lastly, in the months ahead discussions must be resumed with the 
United Kingdom and Greece on the question of their full participation 
in the European Monetary System, which will no doubt require some of 
the mechanisms of the System to be reinforced. 
In general such a decision is justified by the contribution of 
the EMS to economic stability, the framework which it provides for 
healthy growth and the benefit of reinforcing the external role 
of the joint monetary enterprise. In addition, and bearing in 
mind that Greece has only recently become a Member State, the nature 
• 
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of the Community requires that all the Member States should 
participate in the next, the institutional phase in which the EMS 
will be formally integrated into the permanent.Community framework. 
The Commission firmly believes that the advantages of participation 
for the United Kingdom are greater than the disadvantages and that 
the characteristics of sterling, in particular the fact that it is 
an oil currency, are not an insurmountable obstacle to such a 
decision. In the present situation, greater stability in the rate 
for sterling would, by improving the domestic and external outlook, 
encourage investment and serve the aim of strengthening economic 
structures. 
In the case of Greece, the first priority in preparation for its 
participation in the EMS must be the institutional development and 
reform of the banking sector (already started this year with the 
quotation of the drachma on the international market) and control 
of monetary aggregates by the authorities. 
4.3 The Commission proposes that everything must be done to enable the 
Council to take a decision on the second stage of the EMS in 1982. 
It is not only in order to abide belatedly by a decision planned from 
the outset of the system. It is now clear that what has been 
achieved so far must be given a permanent framework and further 
developed. In this way the monetary foundations for the overall strategy 
of the fifth programme must be consolidated. Europe's concern for a 
less unstable organization of international monetary affairs must 
be demonstrated by the example it sets. 
Besides the decisions proposed above which would help to strengthen 
the present machinery, conclusions must be drawn over the coming 
months from technical work, now largely completed, on the following 
four questions. 
10. 
-how to organize a European Monetary Fund consolidating the various 
Community monetary support systems; 
-how to develop the use of the ECU in relatiornwith other central 
banks; 
- whether and under what conditions ECUs should be created in the absence 
of corresponding gold and foreign currency deposits; 
- the nature, structure and powers of the institutions responsible for 
managing the European Monetary Fund. 
5. Another priority aim is a substantial increa~in the Level of investment 
in the Community. This is essential to ensure competitivity, energy self-
sufficiency and growth. Public or private fixed capital expenditure should 
be - along with export demand -- the main factor of growth, and thus of 
job creation. 
5.1 Statistics clearly demonstrate the need for improvement. Since 1973, 
aggregate investment as a percentage of GDP has declined slightly 
(gross fixed capital formation represented 21.1 %of Community GDP 
on average from 1974 to 1980, compared with 22.5% from 1967 to 1973), 
while GDP itself has expanded only slowly. The share of investment 
in GDP in Japan (32% in 1980) is over 10 points higher than in the 
Community, a significant illustration of the relative dynamism of 
the two economies. Energy investment, which is not only important 
to industry but also eases balance of payments constraints, is 
stagnating at around 1.6% of GDP, at a time when the reasonable minimum 
is generally put at some 2.2%, and the figure for the United States 
is almost twice as high. 
5.2 The Community's contribution should be not only a collective awareness, 
the participation in a series of general measures to promote stability 
and growth, and the establishment of the guidelines set out above for 
national efforts to change budgetary priorities towards increased 
investment. 
• 
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5.2.1 The Community must also contribute more directly to the investment 
drive through the steady development of its financial instruments 
both long-established (EIB, ECSC) and more recent (Euratom, NCI). 
The symbolic value of demonstrating solidarity by intensifying this 
action should not be underestimated. Moreover, such a policy enables 
additional funds to be mobilised in the general interest on the basis 
of the political and financial standing of the Community, resources· 
that should be increasingly devoted to aiding small and medium-sized 
industrial firms. This active solidarity is to the benefit of 
national and regional economies where Community loans can provide 
decisive extra help; it requires that priorities be defined jointly, 
that programmes be worked out, that financial resources and decision-
making are brought together. The fifth medium term programme must 
be marked from the outset by the determinropursuit of one of the few 
initiatives that the Community can boast in recent years, on the 
understanding that it must support and not hinder national activities 
on the financial markets needed to cover investment needs or balance 
of payments deficits • 
5.2.2 The Community can also help by defining the best framework for 
investment. The Commission has in view a systematic scrutiny of all 
financial or tax measures tn favour of investment and of the savings 
required to finance it, not only to ensure that these measures are 
compatible with Community rules, but also to assess the efficiency 
of the means used and to identify the most effective techniques -
in other words, to set in train a dynamic process of harmonization 
in this priority sector. 
The Commission will provide the necessary support for this review 
which should cover all regulations relating to investment, for 
instance those which in restricting the use of equipment, increase 
its relative cost. 
12. 
5.2.3 Energy investments continue to be studied at Community Level as 
part of the process of working out an energy strategy that combines 
mutually consistent national policies with the mobilization of the 
Community's financial resources and Legislative powers. The energy 
strategy, even if discussed only briefly here, should be an essential 
element of the fifth programme. 
It will have five Lines of development: 
- market unity based on transparency, the gradual harmonization of 
the conditions of cost formation and optimal exploitation of 
Community energy resources, especially coal; 
- with the same aim in mind, prices that reflect the true situation, 
accompanied by tax arrangements consistent with jointly defined 
economic objectives, in particular for the development of new 
Community resources and energy saving; 
- Community.crisis arrangements; 
- a European contribution to research wherever the cost, the technical 
requirements or the bringing together of highly qualffied research 
teams are such as to make this necessary; 
- an increased rate of investment. On this point, it is important 
to draw up genuine programmes based on a realistic assessment of 
practical administrative and financial possibilities; the 
definition of a clear policy stance on the contribution of nuclear 
energy comes under this heading. Besides granting Loans, the 
Community at its Level can help both by objectively comparing 
projects and their results and by working for the introduction of 
the requisite statutory and financial measures such as subsidies 
or tax incentives and financing arrangements, particularly to 
foster energy saving. 
• 
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6. Although competitivity has become a matter of life and death for the 
Community, we are not making sufficient use either of economies of 
scale or of the positive constraint that flows from free competition 
within our large internal market - the backbone of our aspirations as 
a continent. Under the.-fifth programme three objectives must be 
pursued: 
6.1 The methodical completion of the common market. 
The Commission will continue to submit proposals for the removal of 
technical barriers,the harmonization of legislation which influences 
production, and the acceleration of Community work in the services 
sector; it hopes the significance of such proposals will be recognized 
by all the institutions. The decisions which the Council will 
regularly be called upon to take in these areas should be seen by the 
Council itself as important acts meriting careful 
preparation. 
and energetiC· 
6.2 The int.r.9duction of a Community policy for technology and innovation 
based on the internal market. 
Without a vigorous effort to develop new industries and technologies, 
the Community may well one day find itself trying merely to manage a 
declining economy, incable of asserting itself on product and service 
markets in full expansion, and unable to create the jobs most 
characteristic of a modern, thriving society. 
The importance of a Community contribution stems directly from the 
role which the market plays in high technology industries and 
services. Such measures must bear on the following: 
- product standardization (which in turn presupposes joint or combined 
research efforts); 
- coordination in the use of public purchasing; 
- definition of the most suitable training techniques for which Europe 
of the Ten would be a useful testing-ground for research and experiment; 
- study of the legislative framework which best combines the encourage-
ment of innovation and the existence of the common market; 
-European participation in research on a similar basis to participation 
in energy; 
14. 
- lastly, the information effort necessary not only to gain 
acceptance of inevitable changes but above all to bring out the 
opportunities that these changes make possible. 
6.3 Further real harmonization of the conditions of production. 
1 
1 In this regard, the Commission envisages the establishment of a 
"European Fiscal Model" with: 
- a common approach, albeit both gradual and flexible,to the 
balance between direct and indirect taxation and parafiscal 
charges, 
a framework for value added tax comprising bands of 
tax rate within which all products subject to VAT would gradually 
be grouped according to a common approach. 
A programme of this kind, in keeping with the principle of the single 
market, would flexibly underpin the change of emphasis in budgetary 
fiscal policy imposed both by the current situation of public finances, 
and by the need for some redirection of government action towards 
supply orientated measures. In time it would allow the abolition 
of tax frontiers, the Long-awaited demonstration of the existence 
of a true common market. The fact that certain Limited disparities 
would persist due to situations which are not entirely comparable, 
and to the need for Member States to preserve a real degree of 
financial freedo~shoutd not be a greater obstacle to this step in 
Europe than in the United States. 
Without prejudice to the suggestions made above regarding investment and 
energy, and the pursuit of harmonization in certain specific fields, 
notably excises for which the Commission hopes that decisions will be 
taken shortly. 
• 
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The Commission is well aware that alignment of this kind would be a bold 
political departure fraught with technical difficulties; but in e~blishing 
the principle the Community would be giving proof of its vitality and 
the step would be Less revolutionary than was the establishment of a 
single market in 1958, at a time of high customs duties and, in some Member 
States, generalized quotas. 
7. Increased Community participation in an active employment policy, i.e. 
action directed specifically at the organization of the labour market and 
access to it, is necessary on economic and technical grounds. It would 
also be a valuable demonstration of the collective will showing the 
high priority assigned to employment objectives. 
The final elements must now be added to the overall approach outlined 
above which, if unemployment is to be reduced, will require both a major 
effort on the investment front and an assault on production costs, and 
thus moderation in wage trends • 
The proQr~mme, previous communications by the Commission and notably the 
report on the May Mandate,and the conclusions of the joint Council of 
Ministers for Economic Affairs and Social Affairs together define the 
scope and the means for Community participation in employment policy. 
More generally, the Commission has many times referred to the need for a 
harmonized approach to social protection and the establishment of common 
features in the field of workers' rights, occupational health and safety 
and the improvement of working conditions which could be written into 
collective agreements. Some priorities may here be recalled: 
7.1 First, more consultation between the Community institutions and both 
sides of industry. 
The object must be to bring together the different points of view, 
to try to develop a common analysis of the situation, to seek 
agreement on the main Lines of action and to establish the form and 
extent of the Community's contribution to the solution of problems. 
The Commission will play its part here, and hopes to see a return to 
conditions favourable to the holding of tripartite conferences. 
16. 
7.2 Then, fuller, more concentrated and more flexible use of the 
Community's means of action, notably the Social Fund, as proposed 
in the Commission report prepared under the mandate of 30 May 1980: 
7.2.1 Giving priority to job creation, especially in small and medium-
sized firms and through fuller exploitation of local economic 
opportunities; 
developing mobility on the labour markets thus making them more 
efficient; 
making a special effort to pursue more imaginative policies in 
relation to labour markets in the regions where traditional industries 
are concentrated; 
taking account of the regional dimension of unemployment problems, 
applying integrated programmes that link the Social Fund with other 
Community resources. 
7.2.2 In view of the priority given to jobs for young people, the Commission 
proposes a common objective: setting up, over the period of the 
fifth programme, machinery and arrangements to ensure that, on 
leaving school, all young people obtain either a paid job or access 
to a vocational training course or both thus improving their 
employment possibilities. 
The Council should explicitly adopt this objective. At the same 
time, it should: 
make arrangements to compare national experience so as to design 
the most effective machinery; 
- require that national programmes be submitted to the Community by 
a given date; 
-decide, in principle, to make available, through the European 
Social Fund, part of the funds which the public authorities would 
in any case have to spend (development of training schemes, 
• 
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especially in firms, incentives for the recruitment of young 
people) either to facilitate the Launching of these operations, 
or in a more permanent way; 
- provide for the systematic examination, at regular intervals, 
of the decisions taken by the Community and of the results 
achieved. 
7.2.3 In this context the Commission has proposed the implementation of a 
more vigorous regional policy that would help both to create the 
basic conditions for an increase in employment (infrastructure, 
vocational training, etc.) and to help with job creation in the 
regions which are hardest hit by youth unemployment and Least able 
to remedy the situation from their own resources • 
Such a policy is likely to contribute not only to reducing the 
imbalance between the regions of the Community, a permanent priority, 
but also to solving the specific problem of the young unemployed. 
7.3 The third priority is to conclude the current discussions on certain 
aspects of the adaptation of working time. 
Where the reduction of working time is concerned, situations and views 
differ between the Member States. 
It is, however, necessary to continue at Community level the studies 
on the effectiveness of this measure and on the conditions (in particular 
the need to improve production costs) which must be fulfilled where it 
is taken. Similarly, the work on certain methods of adaptation (part-
time work, overtime, flexible working hours, early retirement and so 
on) must be completed without delay and should, where necessary, lead 
to the establishment of general Community rules. 
18. 
8. To avoid getting Locked into a process of decline, the Community in the 
next few years must restore its economic balance, modernize its structures 
and reverse the employment trend. The justification of the medium term eco-
nomic policy programme outlined here is that it provides the necessary 
framework for this process. 
The ideas here put forward by the Commission, which flow from those 
expressed in the report drawn up under the Mandate of 30 May, do not try 
to cover the entire Community field, but rather seek to provide a 
concrete basis for the strategy of the Programme. The political options 
and technical guidelines should, in the Commission's view, form the subject 
of a debate that will Lead to framework conclusions. 
The Commission hopes that such a debate will start without delay in the 
Community institutions. The elements for a political choice have been 
assembled. And the choice must be clear. The Community's citizens are 
aware of its existence, but perceive poorly its ambitions and find it 
hard to see the concrete role it can play in the economic recovery that all 
recognize is urgently needed. Drawing up a med·ium term economic programme 
has a meaning only if it is used as an occasion. for clear political choice 
of convincing objectives and for demonstration of the determination to take 
the steps needed for their achievement. 
• 
• 
• 
II. DRAFT DECISION OF THE COUNCIL 
AND OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES, 
MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL, 
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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS 
OF THE MEMBER STATES, MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and 
in particular the preamble thereto and Articles 6, 105 and 145 thereof, 
Having regard to Council Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 February 1974 on the attainment 
of a high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the Member States 
of the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 6 thereof, 
Having regard to the Commission draft established on the basis of the preliminary 
draft prepared by the Economic Policy Committee, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 
Whereas the economic policies pursued by the Member States must meet the objectives 
set out in Article 104 of the Treaty, 
HAVE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 
Sole Article 
1. The fifth medium-term economic policy programme set out in the Annex is 
hereby adopted. The Member States express their intention of acting in accordance 
with the guidelines contained therein. 
2. The programme will be kept under constant review during its period of 
application. 
III. DRAFT OF THE FIFTH MEDIUM TERM ECONOMIC POLICY PROGRAMME 
1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
1.2 Problems and prospects that confront us 
1.3 Lessons for economic management 
1.4 Some principles 
1.5 The main Lines of strategy 
1.6 Improved employment 
1.7 Community dimension 
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2.1 External pressures 
2.2 Internal pressures 
2.3 Inflation and Loss of competitivity 
2.4 The rise in unemployment 
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3. THE OVERALL STRATEGY 
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4. STABILISATION 
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1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 This programme is the fifth in a series of programmes for economic policy in 
the medium-term. It provides a framework for policy at national and Community 
Level, based on a diagnosis of the economic problems confronting the Community, 
and on experience gained with economic policy in the recent past. These bring 
out the need for a programme which will help our economies to adjust to changed 
circumstances. 
1.1.2 In the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that economic 
policies must be adapted to face the challenges of the eighties. We have not been 
able to withstand the inflationary impulses reinforced by oil price rises, to 
adapt sufficiently rapidly to changed international circumstances, or to create 
sufficient job opportunities. An intensified effort is needed to improve the 
outlook for employment and growth. This requires improved financial stability 
and greater emphasis on Longer-run supply-oriented policies. This programme is the 
reflection of deliberations on economic policy which have been proceeding for some 
time, and does not offer any completely new insights. Nevertheless, it is useful 
at the present time to put forward a coherent strategy for economic policy. This 
~hould help both the formulation and the perman~nce of economic measures in the 
countries of the Community. 
1.1.3 In many respects the situation of each Member State differs, and for this 
reason the concrete measures by which the strategy is implemented cannot be identical. 
Nevertheless, there remain important common elements in the problems that each face 
and in the way in which policies should develop. This makes it important that a 
medium-term strategy should be formulated by the Community, the more so as policies 
within a common framework will enable each to draw the maximum benefit. 
1.1.4 The problems of unemployment, inflation and Low growth are extremely 
persistent, and due only partly to cyclical causes. For this reason, major emphasis 
must be given to medium-term policy as set forth in this programme, which must 
provide the framework within which concrete policy measures are taken from year 
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to year, and against which such measures are tested. At the same time it will 
be necessary to review certain parts of the Programme as circumstances change. 
1.2 Problems and prospects that confront us 
1.2.1 Our present economic problems first appeared at the end of the 1960s when 
the inflation rate began to increase under the pressure of rising costs, especially 
labour costs. The oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80 added an unprecedent-
edly violent shock: to the resulting increased inflation were added the problems 
flowing from erosion of real incomes due to losses in the terms of trade, and 
growing unemployment. In addition, the instability in the international monetary 
system which arose at the beginning of the 1970s played an important role. The 
countries of the Community have been unable to adapt sufficiently to these 
changed circumstances. Our competitive position in relation to Japan, the United 
States and the Newly Industrialised Countries weakened. 
1.2.2 The trend growth of the real Gross Domestic Product of 5.0% a year before 
1973 declined to 2.5% in the period following the first oil crisis. This was 
accompanied by a substantial increase in the Level of unemployment, from 2% in 
1970 and 4.3% in 1975 to 7.5% in March 1981. At the same time, inflation rose 
from about 6% in the 1960s to 10% in the period 1973-1980. In these circumstances, 
and faced by increasing external costs as the terms of trade deteriorated and by 
rising public taxes and social security payments, there was increased pressure 
to maintain real wage incomes and to pass the burden of adaptation to other 
economic groups. Increased labour costs and reduced pro·fits, and the slowdown 
of economic growth and increased uncertainties in economic prospects, resulted 
in severe curtailment of the growth of investment. After 1973, investment rose 
by less than 1% per annum as compared with an annual growth rate of more than 5% 
in the preceding 10 years. This was associated with a decline in the rate of 
productivity growth, which can only in part be attributed to cyclical factors. 
Insufficient progress was thus made in adapting the structures of industrial 
production:this must be pursued in the 1980s. 
1.2.3 The past decade was further marked by sharp growth in public sector spending-
especially on health care and social security. While in 1970 public spending 
accounted for 37% of the Gross National Product, by 1980 this figure had risen 
to 47%. The resulting increased public financing contributed to the rise of 
production costs and the fall of profits, and thus represented a further burden 
on our international competitive position. At the same time, public sector 
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deficits followed an upward trend in many countries, and in a numberm countries 
have reached such a size as to.represent a serious threat to financial stability. 
1.2.4 Any assessment of the medium term outlook is difficult because of the many 
uncertainties which confront us, particularly at the present time when the 
development of world trade and of oil prices is extremely hard to predict. Efforts 
to make quantified projections are particularly hard. The assumption that 
economic policies and behaviour remain generally speaking unchanged is arbitrary. 
Because of the many uncertainties the results must be treated with great caution; 
they can do no more than identify trends which might be improved if governments 
and the social partners adopt more effective approaches. Subjectto these 
reserves, quantified projections suggest that growth is not likely to rise above 
the 2-3% range experienced since the first oil price rise. Unemployment 
may rise further as there is a very rapid increase in the total working population 
over the next five years, though the extent of this increase is difficult to guage. 
While some reduction from current rates of wage and price irflation can be 
hoped for, this process may well take some time and inflation as a result will 
persist at undesirable rates. 
~ 1.2.5 This clearly shows that vigorous policy efforts are needed in the Community 
to attain acceptable economic developments. The central theme must be improvement 
of the employment situation. Both the reduction in inflation and increased 
competitivity will in turn lead to higher growth and-fuller employment. 
1.3 Lessons for economic management 
1.3.1 Economic policy in many Member States has given inadequate weight to supply 
considerations as opposed to the management of demand, and short-term concerns 
have meant that there has often been insufficient permanence in macro-economic 
management. And inadequate attention has been given to structural changes while 
government interventions in this area have sometimes tended to delay rather 
than to foster the adjustment of our economic structures. In many respects 
mobility and flexibility have been lost. Certain developments in the field of 
social security have contributed to this. 
1.3.2 In the present situation, most countries have very little room for policy 
manoeuvre. High inflation rates, large government spending deficits and balance 
ofpayments deficits leave little room for stimulating overall demand. Within 
public spending, priorities should be selectively adjusted to favour productive 
activity. Recovery of economic growth and the provision of more jobs must 
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depend mainly on supply policies, directed at higher investment and 
at lower costs and greater flexibility of labour and of capital. But curtailed 
inflation and improved stability are the precondition for achieving other key 
objectives. 
1.4 Some principles 
1.4.1 In the light of this experience, the strategy should be based on a set of 
clear policy principles. 
1.4.2 Permanence of policy aims, and steadiness and predictability in the 
conduct of economic policy is particularly important. Governments 
should do all they can to stabilise expectations, and to increase confidence 
of both investors and the public at large. 
1.4.3 Second, in the context of rapid change, flexibility of systems and behaviour 
is essential for economic progress. The functioning of the market mechanism must 
therefore be strengthened by giving greater freedom to market forc~eg by 
encouraging mobility of labour and capital. 
1.4.4 Third, openness to the rest of the world must be maintained and balance of 
payments deficits corrected although the Community must for a while bear its share 
of OPEC surpluses. Community industry must respond to the pressures from an evolving 
international division of labour. Protection is a path Leading to disaster. 
1.4.5 Fourth, progress towards convergence of the countries and regions of the Com-
munity must be an integral part of the strategy. The cohesion of the Community must 
be strengthned by exploiting the potential for coordinated action, and by Community 
policies. 
1.5 The main lines of strategy 
1.5.1 Based on these principles, the strategy has two essential ·objectives: 
- inflation must be curtailed and stability improved; 
- structural change must be promoted for more growth and employment. 
1.5.2 Stability. Inflation has taken deep roots, and is a threat to our prosperity. 
iarge public sector deficits and excessive deficits in the current account of 
the balance of payments represent a danger for financial and economic stability. While 
the policy response in each Member State and its intensity must reflect its own cir" 
cumstances, monetary and fiscal policies and incomes moderation must everywhere be 
combined together to reduce inflation in such a way as to leave 
• 
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sufficient room for real growth. Monetary policy must help to reduce inflationary 
forces by gradually reducing the growth of the money supply to the level required 
forftnancing real economic growth. A clear presentation of medium term monetary 
policy will facilitate its acceptance as a factor to be taken into account in wage 
and price formation. In parallel, budgetary policy should aim at reducing 
government deficits by keeping the growth of government spending in the medium term 
below that of national income. In most cases, this will mean that the growth in the 
transfer of incomes will have to be checked. And moderation of wages is also 
essential. Increases in real incomes must not be higher than the growth in 
productivity corrected by terms of trade losses; indeed in a number of countries 
increases should be lower in order to help restore profits and thus favour 
investment. Indexation mechanisms used in certain countries have rigidifying 
effects. Modification of these and other wage bargaining systems is called for to 
restrict passing on oil prices rises and increases in indirect taxes. Incomes 
moderation must apply to the non-competitive as well as to the competitive sectors 
of the economy. 
1.5.3 These policies are interdependent. Incomes moderation and reduced deficits 
It will reinforce monetary policy in the fight against inflation, and will ensure 
that room is left for economic growth. 
1.5.4 Growth and structural change. In parallel it is vital, by reducing costs 
and promoting investment, to improve the structural position and international 
competitivity of our economies. This 1s the essential way to raise the level of 
growth and create new and stable jobs. Increased price stability will, by creating 
confidence in the future, improve the climate for business investment and innovation. 
But this may not be enough to ensure that valuable investment projects that 
structural change requires are realised. In many countries, there must be a 
recovery of profitability, improved expectation of sales and greater freedom for 
investors to react to market forces. There needs to be freedom for the market to 
produce relative price changes, to provide the necessary incentives for investment. 
Competition should be promoted and distortion of competition controlled. Public 
intervention must be clearly defined in its Limits and its aims. Such inter-
vention in the private sector should stimulate regional equilibrium, technical 
innovation and a reallocation of resources from declining to competitive activities; 
aids which slow down the adjustment of weak sectors should be phased out. 
Government measures should be transparent and should not distort competition. 
Action should be taken to encourage greater availability of risk capital. 
Particular attention should be given to small and medium sized firms. 
1.6 
1.5.5 Special importance must be given to energy and energy-related investment. 
In part this is because it contributes towards relaxing a long-term constraint 
on our economic activity, and will allow improvements in the balance of payments 
and in the employment situation. In part it is because energy investment can 
make an important contribution to a more general revival of economic activity. 
Present and prospective levels of OPEC prices are such that - if it is known to 
the private sector that these will be carried through to the final consumer-
they justify a mass of investment to economise, to produce from alternative sources, 
to adapt industrial production to new techniques and new products which consume 
less energy. Where market forces work too slowly to stimulate energy saving and 
development of alternative sources other than oil a regulatory or financial 
stimulus should be provided by the public sector. The use of nuclear energy and 
of coal is an important contribution to relaxing the constraints of energy on 
the Community economies. 
1.5.6 Public sector activity must also contribute to structural change. Public 
spending programmes, whether capital or current, should be reassessed in the light 
of their structural impact: some public investment programmes lead to or complement 
private sector activity. Particular efforts should be devoted to increasing the 
effectiveness of social security payments, while helping those most in need. And 
taxes should be modified so as not to discriminate against risk capital as opposed 
to other forms of financial assets. 
1.6 Improved employment 
1.6.1 For employment, the policy outlined above which is aimed at stability and 
economic growth, is of vital importance. In view of the present serious level 
of unemployment and the large increase in the labour supply to be expected in 
the coming years, reduced unemployment requires increased creation of jobs. High 
levels of profitable investment are needed to create new and secure jobs. Although 
moderation of incomes may at first dampen private consumption, it will tend to 
safeguard existing jobs, help employment and allow the recovery of profits and 
investment leading to higher growth. 
1.6.2 While increased investment and restricted labour costs are the two main 
pillars of employment policy, specific measures are also needed to improve the 
match between supply and demand on the labour markets. A more effective approach 
to vocational education is of great importance. Particular attention should be 
given to the situation of structur~lly weaker regions, and to training of young 
people. 
• 
• 
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1.6.3 In the labour markets more mobility, increased skills and greater 
flexibility are essential. Greater flexibility is needed in wage structures, to 
take account of the different advantages and disadvantages that jobs may offer, 
including relative job security. Care should be taken to avoid a situation where 
the financial incentives to higher qualifications, extra effort and mobility 
are excessively eroded by the overall impact of taxes, social premiums and income-
linked subsidies. 
1.6.4 While further improvements in social security cannot at present be envi-
saged, indeed expenditures in this sector must be contained, there needs to be an 
openess to take into account temporary measures to alleviate unemployment over 
the initial years, to avoid excessive hardship to those directly affected. 
1.6.5 In the years to come work-sharing will be an important topic of public 
debate. It must be accepted that work-sharing will have to satisfy the preferences 
of the workers involved, and must not lead to any increase in labour and capital 
costs, since this would jeopardize the competitivity of the industry in question 
and thus its employment situation. Measures of this kind should also be reversible, 
as the rapid growth of the l~bour force now forseen will later fall off.These conside-
rations imply that a particular sharing of work cannot be prescribed either at 
• national level ·or at Community level. 
1.7 Community dimension 
1.7.1 Community policies must also contribute to the implementation of the stra-
tegy, and to the cohesion of the Community. The full potential of the single 
market of the Community must be exploited. Intra-Community trade should be 
developed to provide the best possible base for productive investment and innovation 
while obstacles- notably in the field of technical standards- should be limited. 
Use of the Treaty rules should be consistent with the aims of the strategy, and 
ensure that subsidies which distort competition and inhibit structural adjustments 
are phased out. Coordination of national policies at Community level, and 
individual Community policies should contribute to structural adjustment, and help 
to reduce divergence· between Member States• economies. 
1.7.2 A balanced development of the external and internal adjustment process is 
of great importance for the further development of the Community. The coordination 
of monetary policy and the EMS have a major role to play in this respect. 
1.7.3 At the world level, the Community should maintain its non protectionist 
position, and should play an active role in international discussions in trade, 
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finance and development. 
1.8 The strategy's impact and implementation 
1.8.1 The policy approach of the Fifth Programme opens a prospect of recovered 
stability, revived growth and improved employment, at a time when present problems 
and future prospects are discouraging. It is not possible to say how much 
improvement can be achieved if the overall strategy were fully implemented: there 
are too many uncertainties in the way of such estimates~ But this approach is the 
essential means by which the Community can restore the basis for secure and 
stable growth. 
1.8.2 Year by year, concrete measures will be required to give shape to the 
Programme's strategy. Progress in implementing the strategy should be reviewed 
regularly, so that the necessary policy adjustments can be made. This could 
usefully be done in conjunction with the annual reviews~ moreover, assessments 
could usefully be made of the effectiveness of policies in particular key sectors, 
notably labour market policies. 
1.8.3 The fruits of the strategy will only become fully visible after some time 
has elapsed. In a number of Member countries the structural position has become 
so weakened that it will take several years to restore. It will undoubtedly 
call for great political perseverance to restore certain weakened economies to 
full strength. 
1.8.4 To put the strategy into effect, there must be widespread understanding 
of the need for adjustment as the essential means to restore competitivity, to 
encourage growth and to create secure employment. In this respect the social 
partners have an important role to play. 
1.8.5 Over the past decade, the Community has lost international ground which it 
is surely possible to recover in the coming years.. Therefore there is no reason 
for pessimism. The Community has large economic potential. Given clear and firm 
implementation of po~cies within the framework of the strategy by all governments 
and social partners, the Community can turn its back on present fundamentally 
unsatisfactory trends and lay the foundations for its future prosperity. 
• 
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2. CENTRAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
2.0.1 At the beginning of 1981, once again deeply affected by the second oil 
price roond, the Community, in common with other countries, faces the double 
challenge of rising unemployment and high and lasting inflation, compounded by 
the widespread realisation that present low growth may prove lasting. The 
serious economic difficulties which the Member States and many of their major 
competitors share in varying degrees are based on a number of external and internal 
pressures to which the Community's economic strategy must be addressed. 
2.1 External pressures 
2.1.1 All countries- developed or developing- are at present confronted by the 
need to adjust to a series of profound changes in the world economy during the 
last decade: the problems encountered by the dollar and the abandonment of the 
Bretton Woods system which followed, the continuing monetary uncertainties and the 
inability of the international monetary system to rebuild sound foundations, the 
oil price rises of 1973 and 1979-80 and the accompanying burden on the trade 
balance of all consuming countries, developed or developing, the cost of other 
non-energy commodities, the increased economic and financial assets as they reach 
the limits of their capacity to develop, the rapidly growing role of newly 
industrialised countries whose comparative advantages challenge the traditional 
industrial producers. 
2.1.2 At international level, the clearest indication of these economic problems 
has been the slowdown in the growth of world trade in volume. This rose at an 
annual average rate of 8.5% between 1960 and 1973; between 1973 and 1979 the 
annual increase fell on average to 4.5%, with a slight rise at the end of the 
period largely due to a rise in'agricultural trade. This overall slowdown does 
not bring out the competition between the oil importing countries for new 
export markets. The Community was able to bring its current account back into 
balance by 1977, but the second oil price rise in 1979-80 again damaged the 
equilibrium of world trade: in 1980 the Community's trade balance fell to- Z43 
billion after the Z15 billion surplus recorded in 1978, while in the same period 
the developing countries• balance fell from- Z35 000 million in 1978 to- Z60 000 
million in 1980. At the same time, the current surplus of the OPEC countries has 
been rising, and may be some Z115 billion in 1981. As they do not have the 
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economic capacity to spend on imports of goods and services all the income they 
receive, their financial balances are large and rising- some Z350 billion at the 
end of 1980. 
2.1.3 For the Community the result is that the external energy constraint- with 
economic, financial and strategic aspects - is a serious limit on its freedom of 
policy choice. 
2.2 Internal pressures 
2.2.1 The deterioration of the international environment over which the Community 
has little influence is combined, internally, with permanent pressures from the 
growth of costs and prices which both impede adjustment of our economic structures 
and yet make this even more necessary. 
2.2.2 Since 1974, internal energy prices in the Community have been one of the 
factors pushing up production and consumption costs. The pricing policies of the 
oil producing countries, by the end of 1979, helped bring the Community oil bill 
back to the 1974 level, i.e. 4% of GOP, even though oil imports as a share of total 
energy consumption had fallen from 60% in 1973 to 48% in 1979. Reduced dependence 
on oil was due to the effect of price rises on demand and to the development 
of the Community's own production; but the underlying structural change in energy 
consumption patterns was however delayed by the relative slowness with which 
internal energy prices reflected external price rises, at least until the second 
oil price rise. Thus, up to 1978, the specific duties on a number of petroleum 
products which are fixed in relation to quantity, were increased significantly 
less than the level of inflation. This decline in the real tax burden softened 
the impact of the external price rises on consumers reducing both real tax receipt 
and the incentives to economize consumption. In part for the same reason, the 
relative cost of energy compared to labour, after a large rise in 1973-74, fell 
back to Levels in 1973. It appears, however that, especially since the second 
oil shock, internal prices are being adjusted more rapidly to changes in import 
prices, thus helping to make it plain to the consumer that a steady rise in the 
price of energy products is inevitable. 
2.2.3 The first oil shock was followed in 1974-75 by a general wage explosion in 
the Community as wage earners sought to offset the effects of inflation. As a 
share of net domestic product at factor cost wages rose from 82% to over 88%. 
• 
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This acceleration in the rise of wage incomes had a large impact on the profitability 
of firms and on their investment capacity. Since that date, despite some decrease 
in wage rises, the increase in employers• social security contributions has meant 
that this share has remained high (87% on average in the Community in 1980). The 
result in terms of the nominal labour cost per unit ouf output was an average 
increase in the Community of 10.6% a year from 1973-1980 compared with 5.8% from 
1960-73, while real wages rose more than productivity gains. Thus, compared with 
the level in the early seventies, there is a difference of almost 7% in 1980, between 
the growth of real per capita wages and the growth of the apparent productivity 
of labour. This gap appears to be still higher, if the negative terms of trade 
effects which occurred in 1980 are taken into account. 
2.2.4 The trend for public spending to grow more rapidly than national income 
also represents a major structural shift in the Community economies, and an 
increasing burden on firms and households. The long term trend in every Member 
State has been for public spending to increase more rapidly than output and in 
the Community as a whole the share of government expenditure in GOP has grown 
from 37% to 47% over the last decade. The most rapid increase has been in social 
security spending which in many Member States is contained in special budgets; 
• this rise is inpart due to rising standards of health and other care, in part to 
growing levels of unemployment. Employers• and employees• social security 
contributions have increased sharply- one third as fast again as GOP in value in 
the Community as a whole. The size of public deficits increased steadily, as 
expenditure connected with the economic and social situation continued to rise; 
the main consequence of efforts to restrain this growth has been to limit the 
volume of public investment. 
2.3 Inflation and loss of competitivity 
2.3.1 The persistence of high inflation at widely differing rates between 
countries is the first consequence of the permanent pressure of costs and prices 
on the behaviour of all economic agents. In the Community as a whole, the two 
main inflation indicators - the GOP price deflator and the consumer price index 
have risen by an average of 10% over the last five years as against an average 
of 2.5 to 5% between 1960 and 1973. By raising the consumer price index each 
time by some 3.5 percentage points the two oil shocks are responsible for the 
two peaks of over 12% inflation in 1974-75 and in 1980. However, this Community 
average hides a further widening of differences in price movements from one 
Member State to another: the rates of annual increase in 1980 range from 5 to 20%. 
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2.3.2 A decade of rising inflation has now established inflationary expectations 
which are very difficult to eradicate. This is particularly difficult where 
circumstances do not allow any significant increase in real incomes. And while 
the flexibility of exchange rates that- in some countries- may have increased 
inflation early in the decade has now given place, at Least within the Community, 
to greater stability, other external factors favouring inflation cannot be 
expected to disappear in the short term. 
2.3.3 High and variable rates of inflation reduce the growth of output in several 
ways but in particular by increasing uncertainty and undermining confidence. In 
recent years, for example, the high level of savings by household has been in part 
a reaction to the erosion of the value of financial assets due to high levels of 
inflation. The impact of inflation on taxation can also distort information about 
the real profitability of firms and, as a result, can mislead both investors and 
the negotiators of wage agreements. Unforeseen levels of inflation can have 
undesirable effects on the relative costs of labou1· and of capital. 
2.3.4 Perhaps the most important consequence of inflation is its negative 
effect on investment decisions. Inflation has discouraged investment by reducing 
profit margins, raising nominal interest rates and fostering uncertainties as to 
future capital costs, the long term outlook for demand and the real rate of return. 
This contributed to a marked deterioration in the rate of increase of investments 
in most Member States which seriously undermines the potential economic development 
of the Community. The growth of investment began to decline as early as 1970, 
even though the years 1970 to 1973 were years of expansion: this was followed 
by a real collapse in the rate of growth of investment in the years 1974-75. Despite 
an upturn in 1976 and a more favourable situation in some countries, investment 
increased by only 0.7% a year in the Community between 1973 and 1980. Among 
the major industrialised countries Japan stands alone since there the growth rate 
of investment was three times as much as in the Community bringing the share of 
investment in GOP to 31.7% in 1979 compared with 21% in the Community and 18% in 
the United States. 
2.3.5 By major economic sector national experience has varied, but for the 
Community as a whole over the last decade market services and agriculture have been 
taking a steadily rising share of total investment, while energy's share has been 
stable despite ambitious programmes in some countries for investment in nuclear 
• 
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energy, alternative energy sources and for energy savings. Energy investment in 
1980 was some 8% of total fixed capital formation, or 1.7% of GDP; this is of the 
same order of magnitude as over the years 1968-74. The share of public invest-
ment has fallen since 1977. The share of industry has declined consistently over 
the whole period; industrial investment as a share of value added in industry fell 
from 15.5%, at the beginning of the last decade to 12.5% at the end. This fall is 
the more important since it has gone with a slow but steady reduction in the 
share of industry (at current prices) in the total value added of the Community. 
2.3.6 The growing importance of the tertiary sector and less capital-intensive 
growth go a long way towards explaining the smatler productivity gains recorded 
since the early seventies: from 1973 to 1979 the apparent productivity of labour 
increased by only 2.2% ie half the average rate of increase between 1960 and 1973. 
In additio~if capital resources and structural trends of labour productivity are 
taken into account, potential growth has slowed down; this fall in profitable 
production capacity reflects lower levels of investment and increased delays in 
substituting factors of production as well as the fact that certain types of 
equipment have become uneconomic more rapidly as a result of the increase in energy 
.. prices. And now that slack economic activity is established, rigidities exist 
which make it difficultm restore higher levels of growth: labour has become less 
mobile, public· finance constraints persist, and inflation is reducing investment 
and the mobility of capital. These constraints will have to be eased if growth 
potential is to be increased. 
2.3.7 The poor results in controlling costs and developing competitive production 
capacities have affected the Community's competitiveness and damaged its position 
in world trade. Overall, not. only the US and Japan, but also other countries -
and especially the newly-industrialised countries (NICs) -are major competitors 
at least in particular sectors. If sometimes this has been helped by a more 
favourable energy price situation, it is more generally due to a lower wage cost 
and often to exploitation of sophisticated technology as much in production 
methods as in product design. And most countries are under pressure to increase 
their export earnings to try to offset the rising cost of oil. As a result, 
continuing a long term trend the Community's share of world trade in manufactured 
goods fell slightly from 1973 to 1979, while that of the US also fell and those 
of Japan and the NICs rose rapidly. 
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2.3.8 In some areas, the Community's industry has been able to maintain its 
world position through concentration either on quality production or on areas 
of high technology. And other areas of relative expertise - notably services -
have so far maintained their position. The development of the NICs also of 
course opens new markets as well as providing additional competition. But in 
certain major sectors, performance has been disappointing. The share of third 
markets has fallen, and - more selectively - import penetration has risen rapidly. 
And if the areas where this has occurred are Limited, their importance is high 
both in terms of employment- often heavily concentrated in certain regions-
and technology, while the impact can go wider (eg car imports also mean reduced 
demand for Community steel). In the "growth" area of office and tele-communications 
equipment the ratio of exports to imports for the Community fell from 1.26 in 
1973 to 0.93 in 1979, whereas for Japan there was an increase from 2.5 to 3.8. 
In engineering products the Community's ratio fell from 2.6 to 2.2, while Japan's 
rose from 5.5 to 7.6. 
2.3.9 As we have already seen, this performance is reflected in the deterioration 
of the Community's current account balance which in 1980 registered a deficit of 
1.5% of GOP whereas the OPEC surplus increased further. And while the overall 
current deficit for the Community remains of a manageable size, the difference 
of performance between Member States means that several had very Large external 
deficits in 1980. 
2.4 The rise in unemployment 
2.4.1 The Large increase in unemployment reflects the delay with which the 
Community's production structures and the behaviour- of economic agents have 
adapted to the many pressures to which they are subject and thus create new 
jobs. Unemployment in the Community as a whole has risen very sharply in recent 
years: in March 1981 it had reached 7.5% of the active civilian population, or 
some 8 million people, compared to 2% in 1970 and 4.3% in 1975. Particular 
groups have been particularly affected: women now account for almost 45% of total 
unemployed even though they represent only 36% of the active population; young 
people (women included) for 42% of total unemployment compared with 14% of the 
active population. It is true that not all who are registered as unemployed may 
be actively looking for work: national arrangements differ in their means of 
control as in their definition of those who may receive unemployment benefits; 
but this does not alter the scale of the problem. 
• 
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2.4.2 Employment has fallen drastically in some sectors: for example in 1961 
6.25 million persons were employed in the Community's textile, clothing and 
leather industries: in 1978 only 3.8 million remained. The extent of such job 
reductions, which are unavoidable for industrial restructuring,has often been 
lessened by measures designed to postpone redundencies particularly in the labour 
intensive industries. While these policies have alleviated immediate social 
problems, they have generally not helped to improve firms' competitiveness, but 
have tended to build up a larger ''overhang" of change for the future. 
2.4.3 The growth of wage costs has not fully reflected the pressures of unemployment 
whereas the social security burdens have further increased. This increased the 
pressure of wages on inflation which has affected overall growth. 
2.4.4 At the same time job creation has not kept pace with the reductions in 
employment, while it is often difficult to match the skills available with those 
needed for the jobs vacant. This is why the measures taken to help employment 
have favoured parafiscal relief to encourage recruitment, professional training 
and greater flexibility in working arrangements. These measures have not yet 
enabled the rise in unemployment to be halted, let alone reversed • 
2.4.5 One factor of importance for the development of unemployment rates over the 
next few years is the demographic trend to which should be added the net effect 
of migration, which has however fallen off in recent years. Although the total 
population is growing slowly, the population of working age has a much less even 
growth path: after an average increase of 0.5% a year between 1950 and 1978, the 
rate began to rise in 1979 and 1980. This marked the beginning of a period of 
very rapid growth between 1980 and 1985, when the annual increase will be 0.9%; 
thereafter there is a drastic reduction to an average level of 0.1% between 1985 
and 1990. However, this marked fall may not be reflected in the number of those 
within the active working population (i.e. thoseof working age who will actually 
have or seek work), which is much less easy to forecast. But there has recently 
been a rapid increase in the number of women in the active working population: 
in 1979 of the net increase of 800 000 in the labour force, 700 000 were women. 
It is to be expected that this will continue, even if it is moderated by the 
difficulties of finding jobs which may discourage some from registering at least 
for a time, and will probably mean that the annual increase in those actively 
seeking work will not fall after 1985 as much as that of the total population 
of working age. 
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2.4.6 It is also a source of concern that the parallel ("informal", submerged", 
"black") economy, while difficult to measure, seems now to be a major feature 
of our economies. This may mean that the recent deterioration in growth and 
employment recorded in official statistics is overstated. However, it carries 
with it serious problems, not Least resource misallocation in favour of untaxed 
activities which are Likely to have a Lower social return, a reduction of tax 
revenue and corruption of social standards of respect for Law. The growth of the 
parallel economy may in part reflect the qualities of small-scale decentralised 
activities, but also shows the importance of severe rigidities in Labour markets, 
in pay and State regulation aspects, and the heavy burden of taxation on 
employment and production. Thus policies to favour structural adaptation have 
to include efforts to ease the factors that have boosted the emergence of the 
parallel economy. 
2.5 Divergence between Community economies 
2.5.1 The external adjustment problems faced by the Community are made worse by 
the internal divergence in the economies of the Member States. Real Labour costs 
per unit of output and rates of inflation have increased at much more variable 
rates between countries since 1974 than in the previous decade. These and other 
factors have as a result impeded the gradual convergence of Living standards which 
occurred during the first decade or so of the Community: for the Community of 6, 
th~r percentage differences in GOP per head measured by purchasing power parities 
fell from 26% in 1960 to 13.5% in 1970, 15% in 1973 and 13% in 1980; for the 
Community of 9 it was 20% in 1973 and 21% in 1980. 
2.5.2 These divergences between countries• standards of Living go with even greater 
~fferences between regions. The impact of unemployment also varies widely by 
region: in the Stuttgard region in 1979 it was 1.4% while in Calabria it was 
12.8%, and in the structurally weaker areas unemployment is often of Longer 
duration and is accompanied by Low participation rates. 
2.5.3 But these indicators of divergence point to the different abilities of 
Member States to cope with the need for adjustment. The sharp deterioration in 
the economic environment which occurred several years ago has tended to reinforce 
their comparative advantages, the maturity and diversification of their systems 
of production, their flexibility in adjusting production and employment structures, 
their choice of export specialization and their degree of openness to foreign 
products and capital, not forgetting the degree of consensus achieved as to the 
problems and the type of solutions to propose. Thus, the situations of the 
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Member States vary widely, and the results achieved by some only serve to 
highlight the scale of the difficulties which the others have to overcome. 
2.6 lessons for economic management 
2.6.1 It is important that the policy lessons of the last decade should be drawn. 
In many Member States, there was insufficient emphasis on supply oriented measures 
as opposed to demand management. This resulted in increased domestic inflation 
which was reinforced by currency depreciation. And public intervention in the 
economy sometimes tended to maintain jobs in declining industries. Low levels 
of productivity and of investment have in turn become constraints on renewed 
growth. 
2.6.2 Faced by present constraints, there is tittle freedom of manoeuvre for 
economic policy. The exchange rate flexibility of the early 1970s now appears 
to have had disadvantages as well as benefits. The persistence of high inflation 
and balance of payments deficits limits the flexibility of monetary policy. The 
traditional approach of macro economic policy has thus been seen as insufficient 
to resolve present problems. While incomes policies have not managed to hold 
inflation back, in some countries rising public sector deficits have increased 
the burden on monetary policy infighting inflation. And demand is not sensitive 
to macro economic adjustment because basic structural constraints have not been 
overcome. 
2.7 The Outlook: a tentative projection 
2.7.0.1 In preparing the 5th Programme a quantative projection has been drawn up 
to provide orders of magnitude for the possible future development of the main 
economic aggregates. The results have to be approached with great caution: any 
forecast of this kind is,inevitably, based on a number of working assumptions -
including continuation of present policies and behaviour of the economic operators-
which can turn out to be wrong. The results can do no more than suggest trends. 
If the social partners and governments respond well to the challenge facing us, 
then there is no doubt that better results can be achieved than set out in the 
following projection. 
2.7.1 International developments 
2.7.1.1 In the light of the oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80, future 
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increases in oil prices form one of the major uncertainties in the world economic 
outlook for the years to come. The working assumption is that oil prices will 
continue to rise gradually in real terms although in practice this may not be 
a steady process, as recent developments on world oil markets show. This rise, 
especially in the case of countries which are highly dependent on imported oil, 
will lead to a deterioration in the terms of trade. 
2.7.1.2 The variation in the value of Community currencies against the dollar is 
very difficult to foresee while exchange rate variations can have a major impact 
on forecasts. Purely as a technical hypothesis it has been assumed that in the 
medium term exchange rates will remain fairly stable. 
2.7.1.3 The growth of world trade in the coming years is partly dependent on OPEC 
balance of payments determined in turn by the price of oil and by the absorption 
capacity of the OPEC countries, for both of which it is not easy to make 
assumptions. However it seems reasonable to suppose that the balance of payments 
disequilibria will not disappear for the present. It seems likely that the 
growth in world trade will not increase beyond the Level experienced since the 
first oil price shock. The growth rate for extra-Community world trade has been 
estimated at 5% per annum on average, on the hypothesis that imports of OPEC 
countries and Japan will grow somewhat faster than in the period 1973-1980. 
2.7.2 Economic trends in the Community 
2.7.2.1 The growth of GOP in the Community for the period 1981-1985 may on average 
be on the same scale as that of the period since thE~ oil price shock of 1973, 
that is to say 2-3%. This would represent a slightly increased growth rate 
following the present recession. Investment may revive somewhat. There will 
however be little if any increase in employment. Unemployment may rise further. 
It is difficult to predict to what level, because it is uncertain to what extent 
the whole of the rapidly increasing potential labour supply - bearing in mind 
the weak labour market- will attempt to enter the labour market. But it is 
clear that the employment problems of the coming years will be extensive. During 
the period 1980-1985 the price index may rise by around 8% per annum as compared 
to 10-11% since 1973, if some increased moderation ·in wage rises occurs: the 
increase in per capita real wages may remain about '1% per annum. As this may be 
less than the increase in labour productivity, this would allow a modest recovery 
of profits. 
• 
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2.7.2.2 On the hypothesis of unchangedpolicies which already involve some 
constraints on public spending,it seems that there can be some reduction in public 
sector deficits, even if in some member countries they may nevertheless remain 
so high as to continue to cause concern. 
2.7.2.3 The Community's balance of payments could be in virtual equilibrium by 
1985. Future deterioration in the terms of trade could be offset by an improvement 
in the ratio between export volume and import volume. 
2.7.2.4 The following table sets out results for certain important aggregates. 
Despite the precision of the figures given, as already underlined they contain 
a large and inevitable margin of uncertainty. 
Main results of the "base" projection for the Community as a whole 
(average annual growth rates in % except where otherwise indicated) 
1973/60 1980/73 1985/80 1985/81 
GDP 4.6 2.2 1. 9 2.5 
GOP price 4.9 10.4 8.1 7.7 
Investment 5.4 0.7 1.1 2.1 
Employment 0.2 0.0 - 0.2 0.0 
Purchasing power of per capita wage 5.0 2.0 0.8 1.0 
(Corrected) wage share in GDP 0.2 0.0 - 1.1 - 1.4 
End of period balance of goods and 
services (GDP percentage points) 0.4 - 1.4 - 0.2 
2.7.2.5 This forecast illustrates that vigorous policy efforts are required if an 
acceptable level of economic performance is to be achieved. The central aim must 
be to improve the employment situation. This will require an increase in the 
economic growth rate and a decrease in the level of inflation. 
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3. THE OVERALL STRATEGY 
3.1 Need for a medium term strategy 
3.1.1 The fundamentally unsatisfactory trends facing the Community cannot be accepted 
as inevitable. The production structures and consumption patterns of our economies 
must be adapted to meet the pressures of rising external prices for oil and other raw 
materials, and of increasingly competitive activity - both industry and services -
elsewhere in the world. Improved price stability in all Member States, and particu-
larly in those where inflation is above average, is an essential precondition for 
achieving other key objectives. The inflationary gap between aspirations and possi-
bilities must be narrowed. Better price stability will revitalise the private sector 
and encourage profitable investment. And the structural strengthening of the economy 
will in time allow a gradual easing of overall demand restraint. The resulting growth-
oriented structural adaptations are the means by which the rising level of unemploy-
ment must be halted and if possible reversed. 
3.1.2 These objectives will take time to be achieved. The experience of the last 
decade has shown the limits of economic management if this contains or offsets basic 
pressures for adaptation in our economies. It is therefore essential to have a 
medium term strategy which is aimed at harnessing all aspects of economic policy to 
achieving the structural changes on which our future prosperity depends. 
3.3.3 Such a strategy is particularly necessary to provide a framework for short 
term economic policy. Governments are often under pressure to take actions to meet 
short term needs and priorities - often social. It is less often appreciated that 
some measures taken in response to such pressures delay or make more difficult the 
structural changes that are essential for future sound economic activity and secure 
jobs. A clear statement of the policy requirements that medium term objectives impose 
must therefore guide short term management. 
3.2 Principles of the strategy 
3.2.1 The medium term strategy must respect the following principles : 
There must be permanence of policy aims, and steadiness and predictability in the 
conduct of economic policy, so that governments do all they can to stabilise 
expectations and Leave room for the development of market forces. 
-Mobility of labour and capital must be encouraged by greater freedom for market 
forces to adapt the occupational, sectoral and regional structure of our economies 
to the pressures of energy and external competition. 
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-The policy-mix to be adopted must be judged by its effects on structural adapta-
tion and its contribution to the growth of potential output as much as by its 
impact on demand. 
- Openness to the rest of the world must be maintained and the loss of external 
marke~ made good; though progress needs to be made towards balance of payments 
equilibrium, the Community must for a while bear its share of the creation of 
OPEC surpluses. 
Progress towards convergence of the countries and regions of the Community must 
be an integral part of the required structural adjustment. 
- The cohesion of the Community must be strengthened by exploiting the potential 
for common action. 
- The strategy's aims and justifications must be fully understood so that all the 
partners are ready to play their full part in its implementation. 
3.3 Main Lines of the strategy 
3.3.1 On the basis of these principles the programme's strategy has two essential 
objectives : inflation must be curtailed and price stability improved, while structural 
change must be promoted • 
3.3.2 To continuously reduce inflation stabilisation is critical; it requires a 
combination of policy approaches. Monetary and credit policies need to reduce infla-
tionary expectations through a progressive but consistent reduction in the growth 
of money supply to the level required for financing real economic growth. Public 
budgets must adapt to these lower monetary limits : deficits should not rise as a 
share of GDP and in some countries should be reduced. In addition, real public ex-
penditure growth should be kept slightly below the rise of real national income. In 
parallel, there must be moderation in the growth of nominal incomes and a reduction 
in the growth of real wage rates compared to that of Labour productivity, corrected 
for terms of trade changes, coupled with more freedom for relative price movements 
balanced by active competition policies and voluntary restraint. Interest rates should 
be kept as Low as other policy objectives permit. The discipline in public deficits 
and incomes will enable monetary policy to leave sufficient room for real growth. 
3.3.3 In parallel, there must be adaptation of our economic structures - socio-
economic, sectoral, regional and occupational - to the demands of energy and in-
creasing international trade pressures. The stabilisation of macro economic conditions 
to allow higher growth must be accompanied by the creation of productive activities 
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which can exploit this potential. The climate for private investment and innovation 
must be improved by giving greater scope to the social partners, consumers and in-
vestors to react more efficiently to market signals; public interventions in the 
private sector should be subject to more rigorous scrutiny to ensure that they do 
not impede reallocation of resources towards competitive activity. Special importance 
however must be given to energy and energy-related investment, partly because it 
contributes to Loosening a Long term constraint on our economic activity, partly 
because it can make a substantial contribution to economic activity. In the readjust-
ment of economic structures, a Limit is needed in the medium term to the increase 
in the growth of government spending as a share of GDP, while within total public 
spending priority should be clearly given to these activities which contribute 
directly to structural change or which Lead the private sector in this direction. 
3.3.4 Both stabilisation and structural change are the essential means to produce 
a lasting improvement in employment although - in part because of temporary demogra-
phic trends - unemployment is Likely to rise further in the immediate future and 
only fall significantly towards the end of the period. Smaller wage increases should 
help to improve international competitivity, and to adjust the relative cost of Labour 
as a factor of production; rebalancing of the costs of different categories of 
Labour within the Community may also be needed. While moderation in incomes and reduced 
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public sector growth will initially hold back the growth of demand, these factors ~ 
should help increase employment as overall activity picks up. Structural improvements 
in the Labour market are a necessary accompaniment, to ensure a better match between 
Labour supply and demand which can also help to reduce inflation. The social partners' 
discussions of work sharing need to recognise that moves in this direction must not 
worsen the Community's competitivity which it is essential to improve. 
3.3.5 Faced with these problems, the full potential of the Community dimension 
must be exploited to help towards the basic objectives. More economic activity occurs 
between the Member States than with third countries. For this reason, economic and 
monetary policies should be more effectively coordinated, to exploit the greater 
impact of actions undertaken together. Intra Community trade should be developed 
to provide the best possible base for productive investment and innovation to 
confront international competition, while barriers to world trade should continue 
to be Lowered. Individual Community policies should contribute to structural ad-
justment and help to reduce divergence between Member States' economies. 
• 
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3.4 Interdependence of the strategy's policies 
3.4.1 The strategy forms a whole. Without a larger degree of price stability 
other objectives - economic and social - cannot be assured. To achieve better price 
stability, strict monetary policies are needed: but reduction of public deficits 
and moderation of incomes should enable the possible restrictive impact of these 
policies to be avoided. Control of public spending and incomes moderation will at 
first reduce internal demand for current consumption. But incomes moderation will 
help to improve the competitivity of our goods and services and the resulting ex-
ternal demand should provide some increased activ~ty: even if balance of payments 
deficits cannot be eliminated in the short term, the Community should be able to 
make up the ground it has Lost in world markets in recent years. Moreover, further 
internal activity will flow from increased investment. While demand expectations, a 
major determinant of investment, may initially be dampened, determined implementation 
of the strategy will provide prospects of sounder economic growth and increased 
activity which will favour private sector investment, as will reduced inflation and 
the increased profitability flowing from incomes moderation. Moreover, greater 
freedom for market forces will also open up new areas of investment as well as 
speeding up change in declining sectors. It is vital that in this way investment 
contributes to the improved competitivity the Community needs. In parallel labour 
• markets must also 'be improved and made more flexible so that they can also respond 
to the need for structural change. And the containment of public spending in the 
medium term will Leave room for private sector expansion. As investment decisions 
are shaped by a mix of longer term prospects of prices, costs, profits, and espe-
cially real sales it is crucial to reestablish confidence in the future and reduce 
uncertainty through a Longer term strategy of continuity aiming at Lower inflation 
and sufficient profits. 
3.4.2 Productive investment is thus critical on two counts: to provide the struc-
tural changes so badly needed and to contribute to renewed activity. Spedial atten-
tion must however be given to investment which will Loosen the energy constraint. 
Present and propsective levels of OPEC prices are such that if it is known to the 
private sector that' these wiLl be carried through to the final consumer no further 
incentive is needed to justify a mass of investment to economise, to produce from al-
ternative sources, to adapt industrial production to new techniques and new products 
which consume Less energy. Where market torces work too slowly to stimulate adaptation 
a regulatory or financial stimulus may also be provided by the public sector, which 
in many countries carries a Large part of this investment effort. Given the importance 
of this investment for the overall strategy, special measures may be needed to 
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provide adequate finance, both external and domestic. A firm effort to launch energy 
and energy-related investment by the private sector is part of the demonstration of 
the determination to implement the overall strategy and will provide confidence in 
a viable future economy: this and the demand flowing directly from these investments 
will relaunch investment more generally. 
3.4.3 A significant reduction in wage increases is also an essential condition for 
the success of the strategy. For the social partners to accept the change in their 
behaviour that this moderation implies, it must be clear that the strategy will be 
implemented in its entirety. Only in this way will the increased margins for competi-
tive activity flowing from incomes moderation give rise to investment and job creation. 
Thus increased profitability in industry will be matched by growing real income for 
employment. The public authorities must therefore fully implement all the elements 
of the strategy which depend on them, and in this way give greater freedom to the 
market forces which will provide incentives to the private sector. Incomes moderation 
must not be limited to the competitive sector but also apply to the non-competitive 
and sheltered sectors. While further improvements in social security cannot at present 
be envisaged, indeed expenditure in this sector must be contained, there needs to be 
an openness to take into account temporary measures to alleviate employment over the 
initial years, to avoid excessive hardship to those directly affected. 
3.4.4 The following chapters examine the strategy's component parts, and its impact 
and application. 
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4. STABILISATION 
4.1 Monetary policy 
4.1.1 There is increasing consensus in the Community over the rote and broad tech-
niques of monetary policy, especially in the medium term as monetary authorities 
show their determination to reduce inflation significantly. In the four large Commu-
nity economies objectives are announced for the monetary or credit aggregates consi-
dered by each to be the most appropriate for their financial structures. These objec-
tives have been towered over the years, though these reductions have also been in-
fluenced by the fall in,rates of growth. Thus the Bundesbank's target range for central 
bank money growth has fallen from 6-9% for 1979, to S-8% for 1980, and now to 4-7% 
for 1981. Similarly the Banque de France has reduced its target for money supply 
growth from 12% for 1979, 11% for 1980 and 10% for 1981. The Banca d'Italia's target 
for total domestic credit expansion was towered from 18 112% for 1979 to 17,4% 
for 1980. In the United Kingdom the authorities have gone one step further in setting 
a medium term objective for the money supply: 4-8 % for 1983-84 compared with 6-10 % 
for 1981-32. Credit targets also exist in most of the smaller Community economies at-
though for the members of the EMS their exchange rate commitment largely links their 
monetary policy to the rest of the Community • 
4.1.2 Not onty·h·ave the target limits been towered but, more important, they have 
generally been met; although not always at an even rate in the decade or between 
countries, the overall growth of money supply has stowed down significantly. 
4.1.3 This trend should be maintained and further convergence in policies and per-
formance be achieved. A Hrm stand of monetary policy is needed not only to curb 
inflation, but also to induce capital inflows to help finance current account deficits 
and structural adaptation of our economies. To provide permanence of policy aims and 
predictability in the management of policy instruments and thus increase their impact 
on economic behaviour, targets for monetary growth in the medium term, or the criteria 
on which short terms targets will be fixed should be announced; the exact means by 
which this is done must vary from country to country. 
4.1.4 It is important to stress that a given monetary policy will only be restric-
tive if the behaviour of the private sector, and indeed of governments in their 
budgetary responsibilities, makes it so. If the policy strengthens expectations that 
inflation will decline and makes companies, households and trade unions more wilting 
to accept moderation in pay and price increases, the given rate of monetary expansion 
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will allow a stronger rate of economic growth and employment creation. Conversely 
a disregard for monetary constraints, either on the part of companies, trade unions 
or the budgetary authorities, will result in the squeezing out of the scope for 
real economic growth. 
4.2 Public Sector Balances 
4.2.1 In the strategy, monetary policy must be matched by effective discipline over 
public deficits and incomes moderation: past experience has shown that counter-infla-
tionary policy cannot be based on monetary instruments alone. In most Member States 
the volume of public deficits in GDP has tended to rise in recent years. 
4.2.2 The economic ill-effects of excessive deficits are clear in the extreme cases 
in the Community. When inflation remains relatively low they push up real interest 
rates, thus penalising private investment and employment cre.tion (such as in the 
Belgian case). When combined with high inflation and nominal.interest rates, they 
become difficult to· reverse because of Large interest payments to holders of public 
debt, which in turn. come to be regarded. by their beneficiaries essentially as com-
pensation for the Loss in the capital value of savings (such as in the Italian case>. 
4.2.3 Public deficits must be reduced as part of the gradual process of restructur-
ing public spending priorities and containing the overall growth of the public sector 
in GDP. In the short term budget deficits may well have to increase somewhat in some 
member states in order to counterbalance possible deflationary impacts of the strategy. 
However, to avoid short term uncertainty, governments should fix medium term public 
expenditure targets slightly below the expected growth of real national income and 
should keep closely to these targets, accepting if necessary some increased financing 
if growth is temporarily Lower. This should help to produce a trend reduction in 
public deficits over the 5 year period. 
4.2.4 Discipline over public deficits is not of itself sufficient since it will 
largely depend on containment of social transferts, it must be part of a more general 
strategy to help investment, and more general renewed activity Leading to job creation. 
But the need to give priority to forms of public spending that contribute to struc-
tural adjustment must not be at the expense of the control of overall deficits. 
4.3 Income and price policy 
4.3.1 Monetary and public deficit policies will be unable to control deeprooted 
inflation withouth threatening growth and employment unless firm discipline on 
incomes and prices is accepted by all the social partners. This is a key element 
in the strategy. 
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4.3.2 Some reduction in the rise of nominal salaries is in any event likely over 
the next five years, and there will also be a reduction in inflation and improvement 
in profitability. But not only does it seem likely that without specific policy 
measures wide divergence would remain in rates of inflation and nominal income growth, 
but confronted by the need to stimulate structural change and improve employment 
a greater effort should be made. 
4.3.3 Further moderation of incomes would provide fundamental support for the 
strategy as it aims at improving financial and economic stability and at promoting 
economic growth and employment. It would curb inflation. The competitive position 
of the Community would be reinforced, and at the same time the recovery of profits 
would be helped. It would thus favour a shift away from consumption towards invest-
ments. Real wages per head would rise Little but overall private consumption would 
drop relatively less because of increased employment. 
4.3.4 In many countries real wage rates sh6uld grow less than iabour productivity, 
after adjustment for the terms of· trade •. This will help towards an essential resto-
ration of profitability. And it will also tend to reduce the relative cost of labour 
and thus favour job creation in the balance of factors in investment decisions. 
Another possibility which could reinforce this effect might be to transfer some part 
of the cost of social payments to general taxation: this however raises complex 
issues and difficulties and needs further study. 
4.3.5 This moderation in incomes will not be easy to achieve, because it requires 
a change in behaviour on the part of the social partners for which the counterpart 
is the prospect of sounder activity and secure jobs in the future. And it comes at a 
time when real standards of living are unlikely to grow much, although this will 
depend on the extent to which productivity can be increased. Nevertheless, it is 
essential for the success of the strategy as a whole. 
4.3.6 Wage bargaining mechanisms - and especially indexation - must also be 
reviewed in this context. Indexation has had mixed results in the past; in a 
period with large changes in relative prices, especially of oil, it carries risks 
of insulating prices and costs from these developments and thus slowing down 
adjustment. 
4.3.7 It is important that wage moderation, to be acceptable, should not be concen-
trated on certain sectors alone. It must also be borne by the non-competitive and 
"sheltered" sectors and reflected in social welfare payments, as well as having its 
impact on the competitive sector; while it should be reinforced by measures against 
tax fraud and evasion. 
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4.4 
4.3.8 The need for structural adjustment towards competitive sectors also means 
that the market must be free to produce relative price changes. Existing price 
controls should be reviewed and if possible reduced. This is a pre-condition for 
expanded economic activity in some sectors which are critical for future growth 
provided increased profitability gives rise to increased activity and investment. 
But active competition policies hould be pursued in parallel. The need for voluntary 
restraint must be stressed. 
• 
• 
• 
5.1 
5. STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
5.1 Investment and innovation 
5. 1. 1 In parallel with and helped by the stabilisation measures, the strategy aims 
at a major revival of investment by which alone the Community economy can adjust to 
the constraints of the energy situation and to the developing international division 
of labour. 
5.1.2 This is a challenge to all market sectors of the economy, and not to industry 
alone. There is a Long term trend for industry's share in the economy to contract 
in the Community, as in other advanced economies. The pace of decline of industry's 
share of wealth generation and employment however seems recently to have been faster 
that the Long term trend would justify. The Community must try to develop those 
industrial activities which are or can be competitive. The decline in industry's 
share of the economy should therefore level off, although the Cpmmunity's exoertise 
in the field of services can contribute very significantly to its position in world 
exchanges. 
s. 1. 3 To promote the social and economic conditions needed for a durable revival 
of profitable investment, governments must have recourse to a wide range of measures, 
according to the ·circumstances of each Member State. But the design of all such 
measures must reflect the strategy's aim to promote growth oriented structural adap-
tation. 
5.1.4 New competitive activity largely depends on innovation- the process of 
converting ideas and inventions thrown up by technological advance into new 
products, processes or services which reflect the market demands which flow from 
private and public needs. Innovation is required not only in growth sectors but 
also to provide new growth points in traditional sectors. Although the Community 
as a whole has the resources for innovation on a scale comparable to the US or 
Japan, the effort is normally dispersed between the Member States. And elsewhere, 
there seems to be a tess deeply embedded resistence to such change than in Europe. 
5.1.5 In order to compete with our partners, there has to be adequate basic 
long range technological research. Considerable public funds are spent in this area, 
but there seems to be relatively tittle effort to direct these to activities whose 
nature is proportional to the number and spread of enterprises which can effectively 
profit from them. Research of immediate economic value must not be neglected. And 
while large firms can often mount their own research effort, better solutions are 
needed to help smaller firms which make up a large part of our industrial capacity. 
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5.2 
5.1.6 The availability of risk finance to industry and services is also essential. 
In part this relates to the need to reduce public deficits: public financing needs 
can compete with those of industry and help to keep interest rates high thus contri-
buting to the opportunity cost of equity capital and to the attractiveness of govern-
ment bonds instead of investment in plant and equipment. In addition public authori-
ties need to permit and promote conditions in which private investors and financial 
institutions prefer to undertake - directly or indirectly - investments in equity 
or similar participations rather than by loan finance. The willingness of savers 
to supply capital to the productive private sector, rather than to take refuge in 
property or government bonds, depends on tax neutrality,adequate rates of return and 
on clear evidence that the economy is set on the right course of structural change. 
5.1.7 It is also important that the cost effectiveness of interventions by public 
authorities in the private sector, found in all Member States, _should be reasses§.eQ. 
As much quantitative and qualitative information as possible must be provided as 
to the social, financial and inflationary impact of subsidies, regulations and inter-
ventions. These interventions arise from social and regional objectives, and can 
help to gain acceptance for structural change. But in practice they can be inconsistent 
between themselves, or with the macro-economic policies pursued and can therefore 
be ineffective yet expensive. In addition, some of these measures serve to slow down 
the adjustment of industrial structures, without encouraging the restructuring needed. 
It is an essential element of the strategy that such interventions should not become 
more frequent, and existing interventions be phased out to allow market forces greater 
freedom. The need for some aids may continue, to offset major obstacles to adjust-
ment such as regional handicaps. In general, the principles of such interventions 
should be transparency and stability in the choice of instrument (frequent changes 
reduce the extent to which incentives can be included in investment decisions). 
They must of course respect the competition rules of the Treaty. They should be 
aimed at new investment promoting structural adjustment; operating aids must be 
avoided. Although the selective approach will be appropriate in some cases, parti-
cularly geographical limitation to tackle regional problems, in other cases horizontal 
measures will deal better with several important pressures for adjustment which 
cross the boundaries between sectors (eg energy, research). 
5.1.8 Small and medium-sized firms in all sectors are a particular category to 
which attention should be given, because they are sometimes the focus of technolo-
gical growth and can also be a flexible source of employment increase. Already these 
firms are often encouraged in various ways (eg help with research). Such measures 
should also be examined for their efficiency, but should be viewed with more favour 
than more general measures. 
• 
• 
• 
5.3 
5.1.9 The importance of revived investment to the success of the overall strategy 
has been stressed. An illustration is given by a variant to the "base" projection, 
which suggests that an additional rise of 1 point in investment's share of GOP 
by 1985 would result in an increase in the annual average growth rate of 0,6 %, 
and of 0,25 % in the average annual growth of employment. The effect on the balance 
of payments would vary according to the content of the investment. But if - as is 
important - the investment is directed to improving economic structures it should 
have only limited impact on the Community's external balance.* 
5.2 Adaptation of energy supply and use 
5.2.1 While the climate for general investment must be improved, energy related 
investments can make an important contribution. At least since the second round of 
oil price rises, it is generally accepted that the constraint on our economic acti-
vity must be loosened that flows from external dependence on high cost oil imports 
beset by supply and price uncertainties. 
5.2.2 The investment needed to adaptto the new energy situation is very large, 
and is spread over all sectors of the economy. Industry needs to adopt less energy 
intensive technologies to substitute other energy sources for oil, and to produce 
less energy-consu.mjng products. Households also have to invest to save energy and 
in particular oil. In their respective roles the private and public sectors have 
to ensure directly or indirectly that energy from alternative sources is produced 
and distributed. The public sector should invest in en&rgy saving in the public 
sector - which can include a large part of the housing stock. 
5.2.3 Estimates of the overall level of effort required can only be tentative. 
Provisional estimates on the basis of a limited Commission enquiry in 1980 suggest 
that the total of national programmes at present for the period 1981-90 is some 
500 bn Ecu, of which 80% is for energy production and 20% for measures to increase 
the productivity of energy (eg. energy saving). These programmes would represent 
some 2% of GOP compared with about 1,5% in the last decade, or about 9% of total 
investment compared to 6,8 %. Although some countries'efforts are already ambitious 
-particularly in France with a large nuclear programme- the overall Level of 
energy investment implied is no higher than in the 1960s. It is essential that 
these programmes be fully realised and- at least in some cases - developed further. 
* Some members expressed reserves about the quantified results of the COMET model 
as indications for economic policy. They are of the opinion that the model does 
not mirror the core properties of a common policy approach by Member States 
based on a strengthening of market forces. 
5.4 
5.2.4 The scale of this effort shows that an energy policy by itself powerfully 
underpins economic activity and thus encourages job creation. The Member States 
plan investments in energy saving and substitution of some 65 000 million Ecu between 
now and 1985. According to a variant of the "base" projection, concerted imple-
mentation of these programmes should produce positive results on the principal 
economic indicators as early as 1985. Growth should accelerate permitting the 
creation of up to some 400 000 jobs and with slight gains on the external balance; 
concerted implementation by the Member States eases the public financing constraint 
and increases the employment gains.* 
5.2.5 Given present and prospective Levels of OPEC prices, more investment should 
already be under way, especially as the medium to Long term scarcity of oil and 
political factors make it probable that the trend will be for continued real increases 
in the external price. Uncertainties over external and internal price movements 
have however delayed energy users' investment plans. As elasticities of demand are 
significant, it is essential that governments, on the basis of guidelines adopted 
by the Community, take the necessary steps to pass on to the final consumer the 
full cost of all external oil price increases, to adapt domestic taxation on energy 
products in the Light of energy policy needs and to ensure the direct and hidden 
costs of each and thus provide the appropriate incentive or disincentive to 
consumption and investment patterns. Given present and prospective oil prices, 
the determined implementation of such a policy should of itself through market 
prices stimulate the private sector to undertake much more energy related investment 
than at present; it would also help to correct distortions in the present relative 
cost of energy compared to other industrial inputs, notably of labour. 
5.2.6 In addition to this evolution of energy prices, which is critical to promote 
private sector investment, other measures may also be needed - both by fixing 
regulatory standards and by providing financial incentives in some cases where 
market forces are inadequate. The scope of such government help for private 
energy saving and oil substitution is limited, the more so because of constraints 
on public spending and as in most countries the public sector has itself to 
undertake a large part of the total investment needed in this sector. But the 
public authorities must ensure by all means at their disposal - including financial 
and budgetary - that the necessary effort is undertaken. 
*See footnote to Para. 5.1.9 
• 
• 
5.5 
5.2.7 Over the past few years, the Community and each Member State has committed 
itself to energy saving, and especially to reducing oil consumption. Extensive 
energy policy measures have been adopted in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK; they include action to help the efficient use of energy, and certain 
investment incentives to both the household and (at a lower level) industrial 
sectors. Little action to encourage private energy investment has yet been taken 
in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. 
5.2.8 The importance for the overall strategy of rapidly increasing energy invest-
ment, and the scale of the financing required for accelerated implementation of 
public energy programmes, underline the need to make sure that the financial means 
are available, including recourse to external financing. It may also be appropriate 
to consider special measures to mobilise domestic savings. 
5.2.9 While energy has occupied the central position in policy making, it is 
important to bear in mind as well the supply needs of other raw materials. To 
this end efforts should be made to reverse the decline of investment in developing 
countries for the exploitation of raw material as well as energy resources • 
5.3 Structural priorities for public sector spending and receipts 
5.3.1 While control of public sector deficits is important for stabilisation, 
reallocation of resources requires that the priorities of public spending and 
receipts be adapted in the light of their impact on economic structures. 
5.3.2 There is first a problem of scale. General government expenditure is now of 
the order of half of GDP. Its growth is chiefly due to the provision of health, 
social security and welfare, and, to a lesser extent, education. Much of this 
growth occurred before the extent of present economic problems was realised. But 
as a result the part of our economies sheltered from market forces has grown 
while private investment and productivity have been weakened. In international 
trade it has increased the competitive disadvantage which the Community encounters 
vis-a-vis countries which have not yet developed all the apparatus of a modern 
welfare state. Moreover, the level of taxation and social contributions in some 
countries may now be such as to encourage avoidance and evasion, and to make it 
more difficult to share fairly the overall burden. Increases in direct taxation are 
likely to run counter to the aim of improving profitability and incentives to work; 
increases in indirect taxation directly feed the inflationary process; there is 
little fiscal flexibility. 
5.6 
5.3.3 A Limit to the increase in government expenditure is necessary. It implies 
continuous scrutiny of all government spending policies as well as control over 
public service employment and pay to take account of the impact that different 
spending programmes- current or capital - may have on structural adjustment. It 
is essential to be selective in exercising discipline, to avoid the perverse 
effects that some spending cuts may have eg reductions in those investment pro-
grammes which contribute to improving economic structures and which provide jobs. 
5.3.4 Control of social security spending is critical. The rise in social 
security contributions has kept up the relative cost of Labour despite growing 
unemployment and some reduction in wage increases. And the deficits of social 
security budgets are Likely to increase: increased wage moderation will reduce 
the Level of the wage-related payments into those budgets. In a situation of 
continuing high unemployment, the need for social security is clear and the room 
for manoeuvre is therefore Limited. But control over the growth of social security 
budgets remains an essential part of the Limitation of public spending and deficits. 
An effort should be made to prevent social security spending from growing faster 
than GOP. This will be particularly difficult in the beginning of the period when 
GOP will grow only slowly and unemployment is likely to rise further. Therefore 
ways must be found to improve the effectiveness of social security and to reduce 
the hardship of those in genuine need. There may also be some scope for the public 
sector to make higher charges for some services or return them to the private sector. 
5.3.5 Tax structures are also relevant. At present, these often favour property 
as a form of saving rather than investment in productive activities - a discrimination 
reinforced by the impact of inflation. Inflation can also distort the effect of 
taxation on companies Ceg valuation of stocks, depreciation). It is important that 
the tax system does not tend to direct savings towards unproductive areas which 
do not contribute to structu~al change. 
5.3.6 The pressure of social security budgets and the financing constraints of 
recent years have Lead to a shift of emphasis in public spending away from investment. 
Yet public investment in some areas- eg telecommunications, transport, research 
and development - encourages structural change and Leads or complements private 
investment: such spending must be favoured at the expense of other activities which 
make a Less direct contribution to structural adaptation or which actually impede 
it as in the case of government aid to maintain uncompetitive activities. Energy 
investment - which in some countries falls Largely within the public sector- must 
be given a particular priority given its importance for the strategy as a whole. 
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6. IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT 
6.1 It is a fundamental objective of the strategy to restore conditions in which 
employment will increase. High unemployment involves loss of welfare, produces 
serious social tensions, represents unused resources, gives rise to major burdens 
on public budgets, and may encourage the growth of the informal economy. 
6.2 In the immediate future unemployment is likely to rise further - particularly 
in some regions- and will only fall significantly towards the end of the five year 
period. There is a very rapid growth in the potential work force over the next five 
years- growth that is expected to fall in the following five years to the end of 
the decade. And the general renewed activity which the strategy is designed to achieve 
will only develop as its different components take effect over the five year period, 
while the growth of public sector employment will be more restricted by budgetary 
constraints than in the last decade. The impact on employment of new technologies 
is an additional factor: it may lead to job creation although it will make even more 
necessary more developed professional training. 
6.3 Despite this delayed impact, the basic means to create new and stable jobs 
must be through profitable investment and structural change in favour of branches 
and enterprises with a potential for growth. Higher levels of investment may not 
at first provide ~~ny new jobs. Immediate job creation must not be the objective 
of individual investment decisions; indeed in particular cases they may produce job 
losses. But the additional activity which will flow from all investment- with 
other internal and external factors- will contribute to the revival of the level 
of overall demand. And although gradual this remains the only way to provide com-
petitive jobs in the future: the last decade has shown that jobs in uncompetitive 
industries are insecure, and increasingly costly to maintain both financially and 
in more general economic terms. 
6.4 To achieve increased investment, the strategy underlines the need for 
moderation in incomes growth to improve profitability which will also help 
continued employment in some sectors. In addition, there needs to be greater 
flexibility in wage structures and in the relationship between wages and social 
security benefits, to encourage the movement of labour in line with the adjust-
ments of the economic structures of our economies that market forces require. 
6.2 
6.5 More specifically, however, the match between supply and demand on the Labour 
market must be improved. Many governments have a wide range of measures designed to 
help the working of the Labour markets. ALL such measures should be assessed to 
ensure that their impact and cost effectiveness is as great as possible. It is 
particularly important that reallocation of physical resources should be matched 
by investment in the Community's human capital to enable the Labour markets to 
provide the skills that growing competitive activities need. Professionnal training 
must be increased and its quality and relevance improved. The need exists at several 
Levels- initial training, further development of skills already acquired, and 
retraining for changes between the sectors - each of which is different. The Member 
States' situations also vary. Particular attention should be given to the struc-
turally weaker regions where there are often fewer skilled workers, and to training 
of young people: the policies followed in some countries (especially in Germany) 
show that the young are ready to accept a temporary Loss of income to undergo 
training, because they recognise the benefits that they can gain in due course. 
This brings out the fact that, while such training costs money, often from public 
sources, such expenditure can at Least in part be offset by savings on social secu-
rity budgets and possibly by future increased tax revenue. It is not clear that the 
net cost need be significant. And the benefits flow not only to the economy in general, 
through increased competitivity, and to employers by higher profitability, but also to 
the employees whose earning capacity will be increased. Better professional training 
requires more forward manpower planning by firms, which is also one of the ways by 
which the efficiency of Labour market agencies should be increased. By such means, 
not only can the full benefit for employment be taken from the job possibilities that 
investment will open up, but existing unfilled vacancies can be filled as much as 
possible. 
6.6 In addition to these points, other major issues fall to be discussed between the 
social partners. 
6.7 In the past questions of working time have not been linked to Levels of 
employment. There is an underlying tendency for actual working hours to fall. 
This reflects both adjustments in agreed weekly working hours, in actual overtime 
and in annual holidays, and increased part-time working and more flexible retirement 
arrangements. Over the pa& two decades annual working hours have fallen on average 
by 0.8% a year, although in most countries the rate of reduction seems to have 
been smaller in recent years. The gradual underlying trend is Likely to continue, 
and indeed more flexible working arrangements (eg part-time working) are to be 
encouraged. However in present circumstances, confronted by persistent high 
• 
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unemployment, there is pressure to share the available jobs among more people by 
means of accelerated reduction in individual working hours. However, one of the 
critical problems facing the Community is to increase its competitivity on world 
markets, and moves towards work sharing must therefore be compatible with this 
objective. It follows that such moves need to be carried out without any increase 
in costs per unit of output, and must therefore satisfy two conditions : 
- the increase in hourly costs due to compensatory wage adjustments must not be 
higher than the productivity gains which might be achieved; 
- unit capital costs must not rise. 
It would moreover be necessary for any such measures to be reversible as the rapid 
growth of the working population now foreseen will later fall off. It is clear that 
it will be difficult to satisfy these conditions especially in those industries in 
which there is a high unskilled labour content and in which wages are generally low. 
It is also clear that it is only at the level of the industrial sector, company or 
indeed establishment that it is possible to assess with sufficient accuracy the 
potential productivity gains and the opportunity for reorganising manufacturing 
processes that would allow production capacities to be maintained or indeed increased. 
Discussion of such.passibilities that the social partners will have at the appropriate 
level needs to respect the basic constraint that competitivity must not be worsened 
by measures of this kind.* 
6.8 The social partners may also wish to review broader aspects of working 
relationships. These could include the overall economic impact of unemployment, 
the problems arising from the division between jobs with secure tenure and unstable 
employment, the balance between income and working hours, worker participation 
especially in the context of increasing technological production, employees contri-
bution to company financing and possibly the ways in which social security benefits 
are provided. 
* Some members suggest adding the following text : "An accelerated reduction of 
working hours could produce some savings in public spending by reduced unemployment 
benefits reflecting the new jobs created. This easing of public budget deficits 
would indeed be welcome, but governments should be very cautious about letting 
economies in social security budgets spill over into improved budgetary positions. 
The reason for this is that increased employment due to shorter working hours 
will not add to aggregate real disposable income whereas savings on social security 
budgets will detract from such income and therefore total demand for goods and 
labour will decline and counteract the job creating effects of shorter working 
hours. 
7.1 
7. THE COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
7.0.1 The recognition that economic activity is the cement of political inter-
dependence was the foundation of the Community, and more than two decades of its 
existence have seen this interdependence grow substantially. Over this period, 
the rapid growth of the 1960s gave way to slower growth in the 1970s. This has 
not always made it easy for the Community to achieve common action, the more so 
as economic situations between the Member States have diverged. There have 
also been two enlargements. Yet the basic Logic remains: despite its openness to 
the world the Community does more trade between its Member States than with third 
countries and is deeply joined through movements not only of goods and services 
but also of capital and of people. 
7.0.2 The extent of economic int~rpenetration means that coordinated economic 
action is more effective than dispersed national measures. The present Programme 
provides such a framework within which the Member States can pursue the necessary 
structural changes conscious that the efforts of their partners, though perhaps 
differently modulated, are compatible and will help towards the common goal. Its 
translation into shorter term measures must also pass via the Community's 
coordinating process, to ensure the internal consistency which is needed to exploit 
the Member States' interdependence and the potential of the single market, 
monetary cooperation and the Community's international role. 
7.1 The single market and structural adaptation 
7.1.1 The full potential of the single market of 270 million people is not yet 
fully realised. After the rapid growth of the 1960s in trade between the Six, 
the growth of their trade between themselves has slowed, though this has been 
masked by the rapid expansion of trade between three new Member States and the 
rest of the Community to which will now be added trade with Greece. While this 
slowdown may in part be due to slow growth, it suggests that the market~ full 
potential is not being exploited. This may reflect the different levels of 
economic activity in the Member States: it is important to achieve a better 
balanced industrial structure throughout the Community in which the strengths 
of each can be developed. The promotion of convergence is also necessary as a 
means of encouraging structural adjustment and increasing the Community's 
production potential. In these ways, the single market, by providing the basis 
for renewed internal activity and investment, can help the Community to meet 
increasing international pressures. 
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7.1.2 The structural changes which are needed to achieve these objectives will 
flow primarily from the increased interplay of market forces which the overall 
strategy is intended to produce. The Community must ensure that its own policies 
also contribute to this end. But where it is not at first possible to leave 
adjustment to market forces, there should be effective Community disciplines within 
which national measures must be placed. In the industrial field, the exercise of 
specific responsibilities in the competition and commercial policy fields, as well 
as the special tasks laid down in the Coal and Steel Community, means that the 
Community is directly concerned with the situation of certain industries at 
national level notably those facing the greatest need for structural adjustment. 
In this context, while the special difficulties of particular regions may affect 
the speed of adjustment, the priority objective must be to strengthen the 
Community's competitivity. 
7.1.3 The need for discipline in public interventions in industry has already 
been stressed: the Treaty rules of competition provide a framework within which 
this can be applied. Rules have already been laid down for State aids for 
certain sectors in difficulty. The Commission should ensure that when new sectors 
are proposed for assistance, such initiatives do not lead to delaying the adjust-
ment required.but are consistent with the aims of the strategy. Regional aids are 
a special category: all Member States have such aids at central, regional or 
local government level, where transparency is often difficult to establish. The 
extent of such national aids and their broad geographic coverage even in countries 
with high standards of living suggests that in some cases these aids compete with 
each other both within ~nd between Member States.at considerable cost to national 
budgets. The Community's discipline over such aids is already exercised in 
such a way as to distinguish between the degree of priority for the development 
of each region; a greater degree of regional differentiation should be sought 
through increased disciplines over these aids. 
7.1.4 The Community's rules on public purchasing should be fully respected in 
the framework of wider international obligations: but in addition means should 
be explored by which major public purchasing programmes and their technical 
specifications can be announced sufficiently in advance to enable industry to 
prepare the necessary capacity. This can be important in providing an adeqaute 
basis for innovation in areas of great specialisation. 
7.3 
7.1.5 More generally,a determined effort must be made to stop the rising number 
of technical standards at national level becoming a barrier to free market 
pressures within the Community. A recent judgement by the Court of Justice has 
shown the limited role that such standards should play. Each Member State should 
take administrative steps to ensure that they are not a barrier to free trade 
in products made and sold in the Community that respect the standards of the 
country of origin and do not give rise to health, safety or security problems. 
Although harmonisation of standards is inevitably a long task, special efforts should 
be made to ensure that standards for new products, especially in certain key 
sectors are developed at the Community level rather than by each Member State 
with the participation of the national standards offices; as much as possible 
such standards should also be compatible with standards at the international 
Level. 
7.1.6 The development of internal freedom for service industries is also 
important to provide a better base for international competition. Progress should 
be made in liberalising activity in this sector- especially banking and the large 
risk categories of insurance. 
7.1.7 The agricultural sector poses problems of structural adaptation, for which 
the Community has special responsibility. Major adjustment has taken place in 
this sector: in 1980 some 8 million people were directly employed in Community 
agriculture, compared with 18 million in 1958. In parallel there has been 
rapid growth of labour productivity: the Community has become largely self-
sufficient in agricultural products, at a time when Long term world prospects 
of food supply are uncertain. However, there is little chance of new market 
opportunities for certain products- notably milk and butter- in which there 
is already excess supply. And in present circumstances there are only limited 
opportunities for labour to move to other sectors. Real farm incomes per person 
employed have fallen in the last two years, despite increased real Community 
spending per capita. It is difficult to reconcile support of agricultural incomes 
with the need to achieve a better balance in agricultural markets and to reduce 
agricultural spending. But this has to be done. A better balance between 
production and outlets must be sought, which will help match spending and the 
available resources. In addition, the role which agricultural policy can play 
in promoting macro-economic aims, and its contribution through structural adjustment 
to the improvement of the supply side of the economy, also need to be given 
greater emphasis. These wider considerations need to be taken into account in 
reaching specific decisions about agricultural policy. 
• 
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7.1.8 Structural adaptation must also extend to the labour market. Policies 
in this area will have to be implemented essentially at national level, although 
the Community plays a role as a useful framework for common examination of 
problems and for discussions of these with the social partners. The Community 
can however contribute directly through the Social Fund to the professional 
training which is an essential part of adapting labour supply to demand. Faced 
with present problems, the resources available to the Fund should be used to 
help to improve its contribution to adjustment by supporting training for new 
skills. Its success will depend on the ability of the Member States to develop 
forward policies and programmes for training and employment needs. In addition 
exchange of experience between national employment agencies can be particularly 
valuable. 
7.1.9 While in this way helping to free market pressures to encourage structural 
adaptation geAerally, the Community has a special role to play in energy policy 
because of the scale of the effort required and its implications for all the Member 
States; this is already reflected in the guidelines laid down by the Council in 
June 1980. Community positions should be established for international discussions 
with other consumers or producers. The Community should evaluate national 
programmes to examine both the adequacy of their objectives and their overall 
compatibility, but also the sufficiency of the means available in the Member 
countries to assist in energy saving and in substitution for oil. It should also 
check whether the guidelines adopted by the Community on prices are respected 
so that the market can give the right signals: in particular, Community action 
should seek to ensure that prices are properly related to production costs to 
avoid distortions in intra-Community trade. Research and development into 
alternative sources of energy are also important: in view ofthe benefits to all 
that can flow, the Community should coordinate national efforts and even support 
them when necessary. In this area as in others, the best way to achieve adjustment 
efficiently is via the free play of market mechanisms. In this context, the 
Member States and the Community should concentrate their effort on supporting 
the adjustment process by defining a proper frame of reference (notably the 
general investment climate, environmental standards, a social consensus) and 
by back-up measures. 
7.1.10 In parallel with freer flows of trade and services must go free 
private capital flows for direct investment. Intra-Community flows are 
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important particularly for investment in certain structurally weaker regions. 
The Commission, in administering the Community's rules on internal capital 
movements, should attach priority to the dismantling of the remaining control 
on such flows. 
7.1.11 The Community's financial interventions in support of structural adaptation 
include the Social Fund, the Regional Fund, the Agricultural Structures Fund, 
and certain actions in the energy field. These instruments make a useful 
contribution to investment especially in the structurally weaker regions, as also 
do the EMS interest subsidies which represent a special case. They are grouped 
with other activities, and notably agricultural support spending, in the Community 
budget. This has characteristics which distinguish it from national budgets; yet 
it cannot be considered outside the constraints which now apply to public 
expenditure as a whole throughout the Community. The need to rebalance the 
Community budget is generally agreed. As part of the implementation of the 
strategy and in accordance with its priorities, the greatest possible efficiency 
should be sought in the use of the Community's budget instruments. 
7.1.12 The Community also makes a substantial direct contribution to investment 
through the range of borrowing and Lending instruments built up over the Life 
of the Community - the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Investment 
Bank, Euratom and the New Community Instrument - which for example lent some 
4 bn Ecu for energy investment in the Community between 1973 and 1979. In total 
their Lending, even after allowing for inflation, has grown fourfold over the 
last decade. These instruments should be reinforced. 
7.1.13 The present strategy aims at macro-economic stability and structural 
adaptation as the foundation for sustained economic activity. While overall 
growth seems to have been important in helping progress towards convergence, the 
openness of the Community economy makes it necessary to encourage structural 
adaptation in the weaker regions, to help improve the overall economic potential 
of the Community and maintain its cohesion. Through influencing the location of 
investment, regional policies- national and Community -which abstain from 
subsidising declining sectors are necessary for str-uctural adjustment. In this 
respect, the Regional Fund, in coordination with the other Community financial 
instruments, can help to promote economic convergence. In the context of 
enlargement it is essential to ensure full integration of Greece into the 
Community. This will mean a concentrated effort to help this country with the 
structural adjustment that its recent accession makes especially pressing. 
• 
7.6 
7.2 Monetary Action 
7.2.1 Monetary solidarity is all the more necessary in the face of the external 
pressures which confront the Community. The repeated oil price rises, the 
consequent emergence of large payments imbalances, the resurgence of inflation 
and the increasing quantity of freely transferable funds are all elements which 
unsettle the international monetary system and require a concerted Community 
response, both in the international fora where these issues are discussed and 
within its own frontiers. 
7.2.2 Substantial progress has been made with the setting up of the European 
Monetary System. Although exchange rate parities in the EMS can be adjusted from 
time to time, the system is meant to achieve downward convergence of inflation 
rates at a moderate level. This will also help to reduce interest rates. The 
system is thus an integral part of the wider strategy, and it is necessary to 
develop and maintain the exchange rate cohesion it has ensured. It is important 
during the life of the Programme to consolidate the provisions and arrangements 
of the EMS and at the appropriate moment to pass to its institutional phase, 
entailing the ~reation of a European Monetary Fund and the full utilization of 
the ECU as a reserve asset and means of settlement. 
7.2.3 An imponant aspect of the medium term strategy and of the durability of 
the EMS is that of the system's relationship with third currencies. This 
relationship -particularly that with the dollar -directly affects the internal 
cohesion of Community currencies and calls for improved coordination of exchange 
rate and intervention policies, in close concertation with the monetary authorities 
concerned, to dampen erratic exchange rate movements between the world's major 
trading blocs and thus provide a less uncertain climate for investment, trade and 
growth. More fundamentally, however, given the impact of the movement of major 
third currencies on the rate of inflation, the competitive position and the 
balance of payments of member countries, the Community should arrive at a common 
view and assessment of the development of fundamental factors affecting the level 
of the ECU in relation to other major currencies. This would involve closer 
cooperation and consultation between the Community and the monetary authorities 
concerned. 
7.3 World context: trade and development policy 
7.3.1 Strengthening of the Community's economic structures and internal market 
7.7 
is a prerequisite for the development of its trade beyond its frontiers. World 
trade indeed is the motor on which the Community depends for much of its economic 
activity and growth. The Community has for Long been committed to maintaining 
a liberal and open system of world trade; for example in successive rounds of 
tariff reduction in the GATT, in the OECD Trade Declaration of June 1980 and in 
the UNCTAD resolution which recognizes the importance of adjustment to prevent 
the growth of protectionism. 
7.3.2 In the Light of these obligations, and in view of its fundamental interests, 
Community industry must respond to the pressure for adaptation of economic 
structures which comes from outside - as much because the Community is Losing 
ground to third country competition in traditional export markets as because of 
direct imports. The Community, as the biggest world trading partner, carries 
special responsibility with the US and Japan for maintaining free trade. In this 
context, the Community should continue to press Japan to achieve a greater 
opening of her market to our goods and services. The Community should also 
encourage the more advanced among the developing countries to make more efforts 
to lower import barriers and to accept the discipline ofrree trade from which 
they benefit. 
7.3.3 Renewed growth of world trade is important to reduce the importance of the 
Loss of income to oil producing countries. This cannot collectively be made 
up by trade amongst the consuming countries, but provided oil imports do not rise 
rapidly its relative scale can be diminished. To maintain and increase world 
trade, however, adequate measures must be taken to recycle OPEC surpluses and to 
ensure that these are put to uses that will help economies to adjust -by way of 
new investment - to the new demands of the international environment. The private 
banking market should continue its central role, especially for recycling towards 
industrialised countries. It is however important that the strength of this 
market be maintained by adequate surveillance. 
7.3.4 The Community is already involved in financing but should develop its 
role. Its borrowing and Lending activities already find much of their funds on 
the international markets; balance of payments support Lending is being developed. 
There should also be further encouragement of cofinancing of investment projects 
to which Community finance is provided with other sources of funds. Arrangements 
already exist for this in the case of projects in developing countries, which could 
be strengthened and extended. 
• 
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7.3.5 The international financial institutions and regional development banks 
have a major role to play in present circumstances in helping flows of recycled 
funds and in helping deficit countries to meet the burdens resulting particularly 
from the need to adapt to higher energy prices. The Community should seek in 
the international organisations in which it and the Member States participate 
to develop the help provided. 
7.3.6 There are clearly limits to the debt burden which can reasonably be 
accepted and sustained by developing countries which do not have prospects of 
generating adequate external earnings or internal savings. Official aid flows 
remain indispensible; increase should be concentrated on the poorest countries, 
in forms - including better programming - which ensure the greatest possible 
impact. The Community's own aid instruments should play their part in this 
effort. 
7.3.7 The Community is not alone in facing problems due to changing pressures 
at world level. We must be ready to play an active part in international discussions 
- and in particular the Global Negotiations in the United Nations - to look for 
ways which lessen these problems and enable renewed growth in both industrialised 
and developinQ countries. 
8.1 
8. IMPACT OF THE STRATEGY 
8.1 The success of the strategy depends on the parallel implementation of all its 
parts reviewed in the preceding chapters. No quantified assessment of the impact 
of the overall strategy can be given. Apart from the uncertainty of any 
projection, it is particularly difficult to assess in quantified terms the impact 
of the monetary and structural adjustment policies which form an integral part 
of the strategy. 
8.2 However over the period to 1985 the application of the strategy would 
increase overall growth and reduce inflation, compared to the tentative projections 
described in chapter 2. Incomes moderation would reduce the growth of per capita 
real incomes, but the increased employment which would result in due course would 
offset the impact on overall private consumption. There could be an important 
rise in the annual increase in investment, and employment would also rise 
significantly by the end of the period with a clear beneficial impact on 
unemployment. 
8.3 It is clear that despite putting each part of the strategy into effect, 
the benefits will not necessarily flow at an even rate. Energy related 
investments are unlikely to have an early impact on oil imports because of the 
lead times they involve but they can and should generate economic activity much 
sooner. Retraining of labour necessarily involves long delays. Readjustment 
of government spending priorities may take time to be translated into practical 
results. These variable delays in achieving results must not reduce the 
commitment to make progress on all fronts. The course of development of other 
major variables is also difficult to foresee. For example, OPEC oil price 
increases may either evolve gradually or change abruptly. And the movement of 
the Ecu vis-a-vis the yen and the dollar cannot be clearly forecast. 
8.4 A final view cannot be given now of the detailed application of the strategy 
over the whole of the five years ahead, nor in particular of the possiblity 
of using any margin of manoeuvre which may emerge as and when inflation, financing 
and energy constraints ease and as cyclical developments may require. It will 
be appropriate to review regularly progress in implementing the strategy, so 
that the necessary policy adjustments can be made. This could usefully be done 
in conjunction with the annual reviews of economic policies. For these regular 
reviews, moreover, it would be helpful for assessments to be made of the 
.. 
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effectiveness of policies in particular key sectors- notably labour market 
policies. The application of the strategy to the Member States must also be 
flexible to take account of the different circumstances of each. But a degree of 
possible flexibility in the application of the strategy must not be confused 
with the fundamental need to implement all its component parts. 
8.5 The extent of the economic difficulties which now confront us and the delay 
which may occur in achieving improvements - especially in employment - may 
produce pressures to change course. It must be stressed that an improvement in 
the underlying structural position of the Community economy such as the strategy 
is designed to achieve is essential for the future prosperity of the Community. 
Short term pressures must therefore not be allowed to lead to policies 
incompatible with the strategy, but rather produce more vigorous effort to 
achieve the goals the strategy has set out. 
8.6 The need for the strategy and its unity must be clearly presented to the 
social partners. Their understanding of the strategy as the only way to restore 
the long term competitivity of the Community's economy is essential to ensure 
cooperation on their part without which the strategy cannot be implemented. The 
importance of the contribution of the social partners is however a further 
reason for governments to ensure that their implementation of the strategy 
respects the essential balance between stabilisation and investment. 
8.7 The Fifth Programme is based on the potential that flows from common action 
by the Member States and by the Community. In view of the economic difficulties 
and the opportunities that now confront us, it is essential to reinforce 
Community cohesion by acting together, and in this way improving the situation of 
each. The strategy described offers the way to break out of the present 
vicious circle of slow growth, unemployment and inflation and to lay the basis 
for stable prosperity for the Community in the world economy • 
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POSITION OF THE BELGIAN DELEGATION WITH RESPECT 10 THE 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE 5TH MEDIUM TERM PROGRAMME 
1. The Belgian delegation entirely concurs in the need for a coherent 
and stable medium term strategy, as the only way to correct the cumulative 
and interdependent imbalances affecting our economies. 
The principal elements of this strategy are to be found in the draft of 
the 5th Programme; however, the Belgian delegation believes that the present 
draft places excessive emphasis on stabilisation policies (restrictive monetary 
and budgetary policies, wage moderation) and on the spontaneous action of market 
forces. 
It is true that such stabilisation policies are a prerequisite, on the one 
hand, to reducing the costs of enterprises, restoring profits and consequently 
the propensity to invest, and, on the other, to curbing inflationary expectations, 
strengthening confidence and improving the general environment for investment and 
innovation. 
The strategy of the 5th Programme should not however confine itself to 
this necessary, but insufficient, condition any more than it should 
place exaggerated expectations on the positive and spontaneous effects of market 
mechanisms. 
2. A more balanced strategy 
The different propositions of the 5th Programme should be re-arranged and 
weighted around five main points 
reduction of all costs of enterprises; 
- selective support of domestic demand; 
- energy saving and substitution policies; 
- reduction of the public sector's net borrowing requirement; 
- work-sharing and specific employment policies. 
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a) Given the rapid increase of relative social costs within the European 
Economic Community compared with our principal competitors and the fall in 
profits and consequently in the propensity to invest, a deceleration, of wage 
costs is clearly indispensable. 
It should, however, be noted that this policy, if pursued at the same time 
by all Member States, is in part a "zero sum game" and will more-
over only gradually affect investment, while the decrease in private consump-
tion will be immediate, hence the need for a policy of selective demand 
support (cfr. infra). 
b) On the other hand, the reduction of the costs of enterprises should cover all 
these costs. 
- Reduction of the cost of capital, especially by avoiding (within the OECD 
as well as within the EEC) an excessive emphasis on restrictive policies 
and, among these, on monetary policy. 
Energy costs, hence the importance of energy saving and substitution 
policies. 
-Amount of the costs imputed by the sheltered sectors to the sectors open 
to competition, hence the' importance of an active competition policy. 
c) Finally, the counterpart of this reduction of the costs·of enterprises must, 
from a social as well as from an economic point of view, be a concerted 
investment strategy, especially in those sectors supported by growing 
world demand where enterprises, either at national or Community level, 
possess important potential as far as R+D, production and marketing are 
concerned and where, in several cases, the public authorities in any event 
occupy an important position (telecommunication, energy, new transport 
techniques, computer industry, etc •••• ). 
The recovery of industrial investment, initiated by both a re-establtsment 
of profit margins and a reduction of inflationary expectations, should thus 
be supported by active industrial policies at Community and national level. 
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In spite of the domestic and external constraints which are correctly 
emphasised in the draft of the 5th Programme, there is room in the proposed 
strategy for a selective support of demand which, together with the recovery 
of external demand and of private investment based upon the reduction of the 
costs of ente~prises, would prevent our economies from falling into a deflationary 
spiral and could, on the contrary, bring them gradually back to a path of 
sustained growth. 
Within this framework, particular attention should be paid to : 
- the evolution of the public investment, which has often been the first victim 
of efforts aimed at reducing public deficits, whereas a support of public invest-
ment in areas selected to help industrial redeployment should play an active 
role in the proposed strategy; 
- direct and indirect incentives to a policy of rational energy utilisation 
suporting elasticity of energy consumption with regard to price increase; 
-the social securitx system, where it is not impossible to conciliate a slacken-
ing of the general progression of social allowances with a higher efficiency 
of the redistributive effects and a selective support of certain categories 
of domestic demand. 
As confirm~d by the preliminary quantitative projections for the 5th 
Programme, the combined application of the investment plans presently foreseen 
in this field in the different Member States would have positive consequences 
on growth, employment and the balance of payments, without increasing inflation. 
It is therefore necessary to emphasise these positive points by means of the 
analysed quantitative variants and by clearly demonstrating that the effects 
of this policy are strengthened if applied simultaneously in all Member States 
of the Community. 
... 
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This goal obviously constitutes an essential element of the proposed 
strategy, to reduce the costs of enterprises, ease inflationary tensions and 
avoid a unilateral restriction of monetary policy. 
This objective should not, however, be realised either too unilaterally 
nor too rapidly, if~one does not want to cause negative indirect effects : 
indeed, the deflationary effect would reduce public receipts more than propor-
tionally and the additional unemployment would provoke an increase in expendi-
ture. 
The reduction of public deficits should therefore result from both 
- a coherent and progressive application of the proposed general strategy, in 
particular by a slower advance of unemployment and by and easing of interest 
rates as the public authorities reduce their demand on financial markets; 
- an extensive re-examination of the volume and efficiency of social security 
transfers, which are largely responsible for the increase of public expendi-
ture in recent years. 
a) In spite of the positive effects expected from the proposed strategy, unemploy-
ment will continue to increase until 1985 : it is therefore essential to limit 
its economic and social costs. 
This involves a greater solidarity between workers having an employment and 
those which have lost or might loose it, a new trade-off between incomes and 
employment and, more particularly, a reduction of working hours without 
increase in the costs of enterprises. This reduction in ·working hours should be 
both decentralised in order to be adapted to the different situations prevailing 
in member countries and in the various sectors and sub-sectors, and co-ordinated 
in order to avoid an increase in existing divergences. 
- 5 -
b) It is furthermore urgent to draw up a critical balance-sheet of specific 
employment policies in order to be able to specify, in a short delay, their 
contribution to the reduction of unemployment <and of its economic and 
social costs) over the period concerned. 
3. A strategy with a better time-path 
The time-path of the strategy deserves careful study. Indeed, if at the 
beginning of the period, the improvement of conditions on the supply side should 
be emphasised (without prejudice to a modest and selective support of demand), 
one should not under-estimate the risk of a mismatch between the short term 
effects of the strategy on private consumption and its more gradual effects 
on the recovery of exports and/or the restoration of investments. On the 
other hand, if one• can normally hope that the improvement of supply conditions 
will progressively involve a spontaneous recovery of demand, this should be 
firmy sustained by a more active suoport of demand as soon as the public 
finance and balance of payments constraints are loossened. 
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